steve
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Posts: 12,638
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Post by steve on Nov 7, 2024 11:03:58 GMT
Governor Gavin Newsom of California responding to the election.
"Vice President Kamala Harris set out to fight to defend our fundamental freedoms and build a country that works for everyone. She stood up for working families, decency, and opportunity. Though this is not the outcome we wanted, our fight for freedom and opportunity endures.
California will seek to work with the incoming president — but let there be no mistake, we intend to stand with states across our nation to defend our Constitution and uphold the rule of law.
Federalism is the cornerstone of our democracy. It’s the United STATES of America.”
Look forward to visiting the world's fifth largest economy the State of California.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Nov 7, 2024 12:01:38 GMT
Hi lulu. I think you may be underestimating Zelenskiy's willingness to compromise - on several occasions he's conceded that it will be necessary to give up land for security, it's all down to the guarantees for the integrity for the rest of Ukraine. Immediate NATO membership isn't going to happen, but personally I think that he would agree some sort of compromise. Trump will expect UK/EU to pay their share of the military guarantees and Putin will of course play hardball in negotiations - but ultimately can't argue with US might. I live in hope - the alternative of a long slow death for Ukraine would be awful. It really behoves Europe to present a coherent plan, but tbh I can't see them getting their act together. If the borders end up at the current line of contact I view it as a victory for Ukraine and I don't think Putin will be happy. So you seem a lot more optimistic than I do - tbh I think it has been a mistake and played into Putin's hand, to see the need for Ukraine to cede territory as a forgone conclusion and the aim of them regaining their territory as impossible. In truth its akin to saying to the UK in 1941 that they can't beat Germany and should negotiate a peace. That Russia needs to use North Korean troops graphically illustrates that their ability to absorb such heavy losses is not indefinite - we've just allowed Moscow to have the type of war they can win!
Putin doesn't give a toss about US might - as he knows now that it wont be bought to bare against him.
What, when and how Trump goes about approaching the issue we will have to wait and see - but clearly Putin's hand is now looking much better.
Ukraine' is now looking like what is now becoming a very long list of Western/US foreign policy failures - starting with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
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Post by leftieliberal on Nov 7, 2024 12:21:31 GMT
Wolfgang Münchau in New Statesman, giving some more context: The collapse of Germany’s government...fired after refusing to accept Scholz’s order to declare a state of fiscal emergency that would allow the government to bypass the rules of the debt brake, which limits the government’s ability to borrow money. Scholz went on national TV to declare that he wants to set aside money to support Ukraine, and for an increase in defence spending that has now become necessary after the victory of Trump. He also said he would not accept a trade-off of taking funds earmarked for social policies. This will be the theme of the election campaign – and the new dividing line in German politics.
Essentially, Scholz wanted Lindner to allow Germany to spend and borrow more. This is still a sensitive issue in Germany despite almost no-one who lived through the Weimar hyper-inflation still being alive.
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Post by laszlo4new on Nov 7, 2024 12:43:04 GMT
steve Just the last on my side: Remembrance Day (11 am on the 11th of November) is not the same as Remembrance Sunday (closest to the 11th of November). Added: And in your original comment yesterday you said 5 days - so it is the 11th.
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Post by leftieliberal on Nov 7, 2024 13:49:32 GMT
steve Just the last on my side: Remembrance Day (11 am on the 11th of November) is not the same as Remembrance Sunday (closest to the 11th of November). Added: And in your original comment yesterday you said 5 days - so it is the 11th. It's more complicated than that. The practise of Remembrance Day lapsed following the beginning of World War 2 with Remembrance Sunday becoming the main Act of Remembrance on the Sunday preceding November 11th. It was only in the 1990s that there was a campaign to bring back Remembrance Day, here reported in 1999. Remembrance Sunday was fixed as the Second Sunday in November in 1946, because the 11th November 1945 was a Sunday. So, for almost all of us, Remembrance Sunday existed before Remembrance Day.
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Post by johntel on Nov 7, 2024 14:31:47 GMT
Hi lulu. I think you may be underestimating Zelenskiy's willingness to compromise - on several occasions he's conceded that it will be necessary to give up land for security, it's all down to the guarantees for the integrity for the rest of Ukraine. Immediate NATO membership isn't going to happen, but personally I think that he would agree some sort of compromise. Trump will expect UK/EU to pay their share of the military guarantees and Putin will of course play hardball in negotiations - but ultimately can't argue with US might. I live in hope - the alternative of a long slow death for Ukraine would be awful. It really behoves Europe to present a coherent plan, but tbh I can't see them getting their act together. If the borders end up at the current line of contact I view it as a victory for Ukraine and I don't think Putin will be happy. So you seem a lot more optimistic than I do - tbh I think it has been a mistake and played into Putin's hand, to see the need for Ukraine to cede territory as a forgone conclusion and the aim of them regaining their territory as impossible. In truth its akin to saying to the UK in 1941 that they can't beat Germany and should negotiate a peace. That Russia needs to use North Korean troops graphically illustrates that their ability to absorb such heavy losses is not indefinite - we've just allowed Moscow to have the type of war they can win!
Putin doesn't give a toss about US might - as he knows now that it wont be bought to bare against him.
What, when and how Trump goes about approaching the issue we will have to wait and see - but clearly Putin's hand is now looking much better.
Ukraine' is now looking like what is now becoming a very long list of Western/US foreign policy failures - starting with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.I think it's too early to say it's a foreign policy failure, we'll have to see how it ends. When I started visiting Ukraine in around 2006 the fault lines were apparent, and I thought that ultimately the country would be split in two, something like Czechoslovakia. I thought the most likely border would be the Dnipro river and that the big fight would be over Kiev, which straddles the river. So I consider that a final result where Ukraine keeps Kiev and both Kherson and Odessa (a city steeped in Russian culture) would be a kind of victory. The operative word is 'final' of course. In the short term I think that for the next few weeks Putin will go 'all in' on the eastern front to try to gain as much further ground as possible before any negotiations start (and winter sets in).
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steve
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Posts: 12,638
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Post by steve on Nov 7, 2024 14:52:50 GMT
The party that will control the US House of Representatives for the next two years is still in the balance.
Republicans currently hold around 206 the democrats 191 In seven the democrats have a plausible chance of making gains in two the republicans could make pick ups of the remaining undeclared around 15 are in California. Currently the republicans are marginal favourites, because of the system in California the final result might not be known until next week.
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Post by laszlo4new on Nov 7, 2024 15:01:29 GMT
steve Just the last on my side: Remembrance Day (11 am on the 11th of November) is not the same as Remembrance Sunday (closest to the 11th of November). Added: And in your original comment yesterday you said 5 days - so it is the 11th. It's more complicated than that. The practise of Remembrance Day lapsed following the beginning of World War 2 with Remembrance Sunday becoming the main Act of Remembrance on the Sunday preceding November 11th. It was only in the 1990s that there was a campaign to bring back Remembrance Day, here reported in 1999. Remembrance Sunday was fixed as the Second Sunday in November in 1946, because the 11th November 1945 was a Sunday. So, for almost all of us, Remembrance Sunday existed before Remembrance Day. Thank you leftieliberal . just in 2018 I was invited by friend (he passed away during Covid...) whose grandfather was q high ranking officer in WW1 to a kind of ceremony. So, I was at a special space there and had lots of talks with relatives of officers of WW1. Moreover, in that year it was a Sunday. Your comment clarified a lot.
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Post by leftieliberal on Nov 7, 2024 15:05:19 GMT
I think it's too early to say it's a foreign policy failure, we'll have to see how it ends. When I started visiting Ukraine in around 2006 the fault lines were apparent, and I thought that ultimately the country would be split in two, something like Czechoslovakia. I thought the most likely border would be the Dnipro river and that the big fight would be over Kiev, which straddles the river. So I consider that a final result where Ukraine keeps Kiev and both Kherson and Odessa (a city steeped in Russian culture) would be a kind of victory. The operative word is 'final' of course. In the short term I think that for the next few weeks Putin will go 'all in' on the eastern front to try to gain as much further ground as possible before any negotiations start (and winter sets in). I think that the distinction between the Ukrainian-speaking and the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine is important. Stalin in the 1930s, I know deported the Crimean Tartars and I assume resettled the area with ethnic Russians. and I don't know if the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR were drawn on the basis of the language the residents spoke with later mass population movements or whether the Ukrainian SSR always had a Russian-speaking minority in the east. In either case, I believe there was animosity towards Kiev in the east of Ukraine (regardless of how pro-Moscow the Ukrainian government was). My main concern is that the presence of Russian-speaking minorities in other FSU countries is likely to cause continuing friction and opportunities for Moscow to expand its power. The Baltic States are another example.
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Post by laszlo4new on Nov 7, 2024 15:09:48 GMT
leftieliberal The Crimerian Tatars were deported after WW2 (so not in the 1030s) because many collaborated with Germany, even join the SS (if you talk to French people, be careful, because these killed many French). The Allies sent them back to the SU on ships. Of course, it is not an excuse for ethnicity based deportation.
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Post by laszlo4new on Nov 7, 2024 15:12:14 GMT
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c-a-r-f-r-e-w
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A step on the way toward the demise of the liberal elite? Or just a blip…
Posts: 6,721
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Post by c-a-r-f-r-e-w on Nov 7, 2024 15:23:36 GMT
A few tidbits from the Telegraph
- Biden set to address the US at 4pm GMT
- Control of the House of Representatives could come down to a single seat, with the race poised on a knife edge.
- Musk’s trans daughter vows to leave US after Trump win
- Guardian offers counselling to staff after ‘upsetting’ Trump election result
- Angela Rayner once described Donald Trump as a “buffoon” who has “no place in the White House”.
- Musk spent more than $130m to support Trump and other Republicans, although it is already an investment that has repaid itself several times over. Tesla’s shares rose 14pc in pre-market trading on Wednesday, adding around $15bn to Musk’s $264bn fortune.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Nov 7, 2024 15:26:45 GMT
I think it's too early to say it's a foreign policy failure, we'll have to see how it ends. When I started visiting Ukraine in around 2006 the fault lines were apparent, and I thought that ultimately the country would be split in two, something like Czechoslovakia. I thought the most likely border would be the Dnipro river and that the big fight would be over Kiev, which straddles the river. So I consider that a final result where Ukraine keeps Kiev and both Kherson and Odessa (a city steeped in Russian culture) would be a kind of victory. The operative word is 'final' of course. In the short term I think that for the next few weeks Putin will go 'all in' on the eastern front to try to gain as much further ground as possible before any negotiations start (and winter sets in).
First time I went to Kiev was '08, and at the time I remember thinking the vibe and attitude was different to Moscow and seemed, especially amongst the young, to be looking more to the West. The last time I went was just before Russia (lets call it for what it was) invaded Crimea. And over that time the shift towards the West was quite significant, even amongst those who were 'Russian' speakers.
So look, the failure to secure the territorial integrity of a democratic sovereign state and counter Russian territorial expansion is a failure on any count, as is the impact it has on the integrity of a rules based international system, (which now seems to have been lost). I agree Putin is now going top push his advantage - so I cant see any outcome that does not have those two failure points for the West as components. Given the different ways in which the West could have approached/responded, and Russia's military shortcomings I don't think the fact that some entity called the Ukraine continues to exist as a mark of success or victory. Given the sacrifices that Ukrainians have made, I struggle to see how Zelensky can politically survive a peace agreement that most Ukrainians will see as defeat. The nature of the political regime that emerges in Kiev post-war is uncertain and we have no guarantee that it will be a pro-Wester/Democratic one. Apologies if I am being too pessimistic, but the likely outcome now is one which is highly detrimental to our long term interest.
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domjg
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Post by domjg on Nov 7, 2024 15:30:18 GMT
I think it's too early to say it's a foreign policy failure, we'll have to see how it ends. When I started visiting Ukraine in around 2006 the fault lines were apparent, and I thought that ultimately the country would be split in two, something like Czechoslovakia. I thought the most likely border would be the Dnipro river and that the big fight would be over Kiev, which straddles the river. So I consider that a final result where Ukraine keeps Kiev and both Kherson and Odessa (a city steeped in Russian culture) would be a kind of victory. The operative word is 'final' of course. In the short term I think that for the next few weeks Putin will go 'all in' on the eastern front to try to gain as much further ground as possible before any negotiations start (and winter sets in). I think that the distinction between the Ukrainian-speaking and the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine is important. Stalin in the 1930s, I know deported the Crimean Tartars and I assume resettled the area with ethnic Russians. and I don't know if the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR were drawn on the basis of the language the residents spoke with later mass population movements or whether the Ukrainian SSR always had a Russian-speaking minority in the east. In either case, I believe there was animosity towards Kiev in the east of Ukraine (regardless of how pro-Moscow the Ukrainian government was). My main concern is that the presence of Russian-speaking minorities in other FSU countries is likely to cause continuing friction and opportunities for Moscow to expand its power. The Baltic States are another example. I remember many years ago seeing a linguistic map of Europe from I think the late 19th or early 20th century and can recall clearly it showed the Ukrainian language (or Little Russian/Ruthenian as it was sometimes then referred to) being dominant over the entire territory of modern Ukraine (excluding Crimea) and in fact even into part of Southern Russia. How accurate that was I don't know though it did very accurately show the pockets of German speaking territory that were then spread across Eastern Europe pre the 1945+ expulsions (which is why I was looking at it). I don't know then whether southern/eastern Ukraine only became primarily Russian speaking during Soviet times? I think however it's also very fair to say here that language does not indicate national identity/affiliation. Kharkhiv is mostly Russian speaking and it's population are stoically defiant in the face of Russian aggression. I don't think we'd ever suggest the Irish would be happy to be in the UK simply because they speak English as their native tongue. I recall watching news footage of Ukrainian troops entering Kherson and embracing locals after the Russians gave it up. The jubilant interactions were all in Russian.
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domjg
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Post by domjg on Nov 7, 2024 15:36:13 GMT
@lululemonmustdobetter
"So look, the failure to secure the territorial integrity of a democratic sovereign state and counter Russian territorial expansion is a failure on any count, as is the impact it has on the integrity of a rules based international system"
This for me has always been key for the future security of the world however in all honesty we gave up on that in 2014, on Barack Obama's watch. I suspect there was an attitude in the state department that with all their disputes and unrecognised but enduring mini states like Transdinistria and South Ossetia that ex internal Soviet borders were somehow less sacrosant than others (apart from the Baltics).
That's not a message however that would ever be seen and understood by aggressive dictators in other parts of the world. All they see is aggression tolerated/rewarded.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Nov 7, 2024 15:46:13 GMT
I think that the distinction between the Ukrainian-speaking and the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine is important. Stalin in the 1930s, I know deported the Crimean Tartars and I assume resettled the area with ethnic Russians. and I don't know if the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR were drawn on the basis of the language the residents spoke with later mass population movements or whether the Ukrainian SSR always had a Russian-speaking minority in the east. In either case, I believe there was animosity towards Kiev in the east of Ukraine (regardless of how pro-Moscow the Ukrainian government was). My main concern is that the presence of Russian-speaking minorities in other FSU countries is likely to cause continuing friction and opportunities for Moscow to expand its power. The Baltic States are another example. If my memory serves, the boundaries of the Union Republics were set in '56 and in place at the time of the dissolution of the USSR in '91. It was in '56 when Crimea became part of the Ukraine. The boundaries in place in '91 became the internationally recognised ones.
The eastern parts of Ukraine are arguably much more historically 'Ukrainian' than some of the more western parts, many of which were formally part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire / then Poland.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Nov 7, 2024 15:49:08 GMT
@lululemonmustdobetter "So look, the failure to secure the territorial integrity of a democratic sovereign state and counter Russian territorial expansion is a failure on any count, as is the impact it has on the integrity of a rules based international system" This for me has always been key for the future security of the world however in all honesty we gave up on that in 2014, on Barack Obama's watch. I suspect there was an attitude in the state department that with all their disputes and unrecognised but enduring mini states like Transdinistria and South Ossetia that ex internal Soviet borders were somehow less sacrosant than others (apart from the Baltics). That's not a message however that would ever be seen and understood by aggressive dictators in other parts of the world. All they see is aggression tolerated/rewarded. Hi domjg, I would very much agree, which is why I see what's happening as part of a long list of failures.
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Post by colin on Nov 7, 2024 15:57:30 GMT
Trump will expect UK/EU to pay their share of the military guarantees and Putin will of course play hardball in negotiations It seems to me that the issue you identity-post conflict Ukraine-is going to be much more difficult to resolve than stopping the fighting. I make the assumption that without US military support and maintenance of the Patriot systems etc , Ukraine could no longer prosecute the war or defend its cities. There is the side issue of whether Europe would be capable and willing to go it alone in continuing support and whether that support would be enough. For a variety of reasons I discount that. So if Trump tells Zelensky he gets no more military support i presume Zelensky has to try and keep what he can. Its difficult to see what leverage Z would have, but as you suggest , without defence guarantees he is at the mercy of Putin. I cant see any leverage Trump will have on Putin. All Putin has to do is wait for Zelensky to run out of ammo and come begging. He will hold all the cards in that "negotiation" on borders. Indeed might Putin make it a condition of cessation that there will be no post conflict guarantees of Ukrainian "sovereignty" ? A concept he has rejected, Ukraine being a part of Russia in his opinion. The only thing i can think of which might bring Putin to a mutually acceptable border settlement is withdrawal of all sanctions. But lets suppose that is conceded by Trump and a partition is agreed . What Defence Guarantee is Zelensky going to be offered which means a thing in reality?. Which countries are going to sign on the dotted line that they will go to war with Russia if Putin-a man who cannot be trusted -moves yet further into Ukraine?. Trump's USA ? Germany ? France ? UK ? And will the end of sanctions include release of the frozen Russian Central Bank funds?. The funds which the EU has said will be used to repay the €35 billion loan it just made to Ukraine to rebuild it and prepare for EU membership ? ! And supposing all of these issues are resolved and UKraine agrees its borders with Russia and the fighting stops. Once martial law is lifted in Ukraine the postponed Presidential Elections take place. Elections in a country ravaged and wearied by war which just saw a chunk of it transferred to Russia. Putin has a well rehearsed playbook for Elections like this in its backyard. Does a "Georgian" fate awaiting a post conflict , post election Ukraine ? If so the first people saying I told you so will be the Poles who have been preparing for a border with Greater Russia for some time. Finally, the idea that Trump and the EU member states can actually agree on every one of these loose ends and bring what is left of a sovereign Ukraine to a secure place in NATO & the EU seems far fetched to me . And an Over My Dead Body prospect for Vladimir Putin. I think he holds all the cards now and Poland has been very farsighted.
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Post by colin on Nov 7, 2024 15:59:42 GMT
- Guardian offers counselling to staff after ‘upsetting’ Trump election result
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c-a-r-f-r-e-w
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A step on the way toward the demise of the liberal elite? Or just a blip…
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Post by c-a-r-f-r-e-w on Nov 7, 2024 16:08:50 GMT
Interesting analysis of the shifts in the election:
“Every demographic moved to the Republicans apart from the over 65s (the young had the biggest move rightwards), college educated white women (and even then mainly the single), and the top of the income range (Trump gained support from the rest of the income range).
This confirms that there has been a realignment of politics. We can now say that 2016 was a realigning election, when the new pattern of politics became apparent, while 2020 was a decisive election, which consolidated that realignment with a clear victory for one side. What is this new alignment, and how does it manifest in votes, as distributed by class, age, education, and geography?
It is essentially a divide between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. One side favours national states based on a clearly defined sense of national identity as the basis of political order and looks to the national state to act in their interests as they see them, by checking migration and taking an active role in economic matters while sustaining a strong welfare system for citizens. The other side favours an individualist and transnational kind of living and governance that makes identities plural and matters of choice rather than something one is born into.
The second side are, sociologically speaking, graduates (increasingly female) who work in globally traded parts of the world economy that are based in metropolitan core areas with transnational connections. The first are people who are not graduates and work in more locally traded products and services and live in suburbs, small towns, rural areas, and old industrial regions. This is the pattern of politics we can see everywhere and this is a clear victory for the nationalist side.
There are clear lessons for the Left and Right outside the US, including here in the UK. For the Left, three things: firstly, cheer up – money is not essential to political success. The Democrats massively outspent the Republicans to no effect. The idea that the wealthy can buy and control politics should be binned. Secondly, the centre of gravity in the electorate of developed countries has moved clearly Leftwards – the old Reagan era Republican orthodoxy is gone.
There is ample room for a quite radical Left economic platform – as 2017 also showed. Thirdly that to win an election on such a platform the radical cultural progressivism on things like gender identity and identity politics more generally has to be dialled back or abandoned. You can and should defend the rights of migrants and make the case for migration’s benefits while more generally defending pluralistic ideas of national identity, but that can’t be done by condemning anyone who disagrees with that as prejudiced. Make a positive casserole instead.
For the Right the celebration of success should come with two points which may alarm some. Firstly, the new coalition Trump has forged is anti-socialist but also opposed to what we may call neoliberalism, a globalised economy dominated by finance. Trying out a replay of the Thatcher or Reagan playbook will lose those voters very quickly.
Secondly, with Trump’s election we are seeing the end of an international order founded on the idea that the United States is a proposition nation with a mission to remake the world in its image. Instead, we are now in a genuinely multipolar world with major differences as to what the best kind of government or social order is. There is need for serious thinking about what that means.”
Telegraph
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Post by johntel on Nov 7, 2024 16:12:18 GMT
I think it's too early to say it's a foreign policy failure, we'll have to see how it ends. When I started visiting Ukraine in around 2006 the fault lines were apparent, and I thought that ultimately the country would be split in two, something like Czechoslovakia. I thought the most likely border would be the Dnipro river and that the big fight would be over Kiev, which straddles the river. So I consider that a final result where Ukraine keeps Kiev and both Kherson and Odessa (a city steeped in Russian culture) would be a kind of victory. The operative word is 'final' of course. In the short term I think that for the next few weeks Putin will go 'all in' on the eastern front to try to gain as much further ground as possible before any negotiations start (and winter sets in).
First time I went to Kiev was '08, and at the time I remember thinking the vibe and attitude was different to Moscow and seemed, especially amongst the young, to be looking more to the West. The last time I went was just before Russia (lets call it for what it was) invaded Crimea. And over that time the shift towards the West was quite significant, even amongst those who were 'Russian' speakers.
So look, the failure to secure the territorial integrity of a democratic sovereign state and counter Russian territorial expansion is a failure on any count, as is the impact it has on the integrity of a rules based international system, (which now seems to have been lost). I agree Putin is now going top push his advantage - so I cant see any outcome that does not have those two failure points for the West as components. Given the different ways in which the West could have approached/responded, and Russia's military shortcomings I don't think the fact that some entity called the Ukraine continues to exist as a mark of success or victory. Given the sacrifices that Ukrainians have made, I struggle to see how Zelensky can politically survive a peace agreement that most Ukrainians will see as defeat. The nature of the political regime that emerges in Kiev post-war is uncertain and we have no guarantee that it will be a pro-Wester/Democratic one. Apologies if I am being too pessimistic, but the likely outcome now is one which is highly detrimental to our long term interest. @lulu You're right about Kiev looking West around '08 - and you could say exactly the same about Moscow at that time too. Unfortunately Putin made it his life's work to stop it. That's an interesting point about the 'rules-based international system' - which can be invoked by anyone who wants to defend the status quo and is ignored by anyone with a powerful army. Playing devil's advocate, where is the rule written that Taiwan is not part of China, that the Falklands belong to the UK, that Israel now owns the land that used to belong to Palestinians, that the US has the right to invade Iraq? Surely 'the rules' are just the embodiment of the current power balance at the time and can be changed at any time by the the will of the powerful?
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Nov 7, 2024 16:24:45 GMT
I think he holds all the cards now and Poland has been very farsighted. There was no way this was going to end with merry partying and everyone being friends. Russia's position is clear, invasion is a perfectly acceptable means of expanding the state. So not sure its 'very farsighted' to be preparing for trouble, whether Ukraine falls or not. What is very not farsighted is other european nations doing nothing and leaving it to the US - who are obviously going to get sick of paying to defend europe whoever was president.
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Post by johntel on Nov 7, 2024 16:35:45 GMT
I think that the distinction between the Ukrainian-speaking and the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine is important. Stalin in the 1930s, I know deported the Crimean Tartars and I assume resettled the area with ethnic Russians. and I don't know if the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR were drawn on the basis of the language the residents spoke with later mass population movements or whether the Ukrainian SSR always had a Russian-speaking minority in the east. In either case, I believe there was animosity towards Kiev in the east of Ukraine (regardless of how pro-Moscow the Ukrainian government was). My main concern is that the presence of Russian-speaking minorities in other FSU countries is likely to cause continuing friction and opportunities for Moscow to expand its power. The Baltic States are another example. If my memory serves, the boundaries of the Union Republics were set in '56 and in place at the time of the dissolution of the USSR in '91. It was in '56 when Crimea became part of the Ukraine. The boundaries in place in '91 became the internationally recognised ones.
The eastern parts of Ukraine are arguably much more historically 'Ukrainian' than some of the more western parts, many of which were formally part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire / then Poland. Yes my brother-in-law's father was born in a part of Poland that later became part of Ukraine. In WW2 he escaped to the UK and became a Spitfire pilot. However in political terms the east Ukraine based pro-Russian 'Party of Regions' was the largest party in Ukraine from 2006 to 2014.
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patrickbrian
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These things seem small and undistinguishable, like far off mountains turned into clouds
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Post by patrickbrian on Nov 7, 2024 17:12:53 GMT
The prospect of the USA giving up its self-appointed role as the world's policeman (if it happens) fills me with ambivalence.....
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Post by turk on Nov 7, 2024 17:55:19 GMT
Carfew
I think your reading far to much into reasons why the US election was a landslide for Trump .For those of us who were listening to both sides daily for months it was far more simple.
Trump was speaking to people about everyday matters which effected them in there daily lives. Harris was speaking at people with things that didn’t matter to them in there daily lives It really was no more complicated than that.
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c-a-r-f-r-e-w
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A step on the way toward the demise of the liberal elite? Or just a blip…
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Post by c-a-r-f-r-e-w on Nov 7, 2024 18:03:23 GMT
Carfew I think your reading far to much into reasons why the US election was a landslide for Trump .For those of us who were listening to both sides daily for months it was far more simple. Trump was speaking to people about everyday matters which effected them in there daily lives. Harris was speaking at people with things that didn’t matter to them in there daily lives It really was no more complicated than that. well it isn’t my analysis*, and I don’t know how much it’s explaining the outcome of this election, as opposed to pointing to some factors that may affect future elections. Pointing out that spending quite a bit more money didn’t work, for example, or that a more left-wing economic prospectus might be ok, and that there is a divide between the cosmopolitans and those more for the state, with the latter being in the ascendent at the mo… * although it does chime a bit with what I’ve been saying about the “small-staters” vs. those for “more state”, for eggers
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Post by RAF on Nov 7, 2024 18:11:34 GMT
Some more grist to the mill on the difference between Trump and Rupblicans in some down ballot races (courtesy of John Ralson).
In Nevada, Trump is over 51k votes ahead of Harris, with 17k voters voting for None of The Above. However in the House race, Rosen (D) is leading Brown by 13k votes, with 39K voting for NOTA.
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Post by leftieliberal on Nov 7, 2024 18:15:55 GMT
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Nov 7, 2024 18:17:06 GMT
@lulu You're right about Kiev looking West around '08 - and you could say exactly the same about Moscow at that time too. Unfortunately Putin made it his life's work to stop it. That's an interesting point about the 'rules-based international system' - which can be invoked by anyone who wants to defend the status quo and is ignored by anyone with a powerful army. Playing devil's advocate, where is the rule written that Taiwan is not part of China, that the Falklands belong to the UK, that Israel now owns the land that used to belong to Palestinians, that the US has the right to invade Iraq? Surely 'the rules' are just the embodiment of the current power balance at the time and can be changed at any time by the the will of the powerful? Oh you cynic johntel. Clearly I'm referring to what is in IR terms described as Liberal Internal Order/Rules Base Order which is based on the principle of liberal democracy, internationalism etc as opposed to state based approach favoured Russia and China, in which their are no universally applicable rights, norms or responsibilities etc. The former is not based, as you imply, on the might is right approach although all systems in order to function do rely to a certain to degree on the application/threat of use of force.
Now, while not wanting to bore everyone with a detailed explanation of all the examples you give, the Israel one is important in terms of how the US/Israel has acted since the Oslo Accords in a manner that has undermined the credibility of the system. Now the system and its application have never been perfect, but personally I think that framework is far more preferrable than one where actors are entitled to invade their neighbours, bomb their cities, perpetrate war crimes. Don't you agree?
Now don't get me wrong, I see successive American administration just as culpable in different ways, for the breakdown of the rules based system as Putin.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Nov 7, 2024 19:07:25 GMT
Now, while not wanting to bore everyone with a detailed explanation of all the examples you give, the Israel one is important in terms of how the US/Israel has acted since the Oslo Accords in a manner that has undermined the credibility of the system. Now the system and its application have never been perfect, but personally I think that framework is far more preferrable than one where actors are entitled to invade their neighbours, bomb their cities, perpetrate war crimes. Don't you agree? The framework where actors were not free to bomb each other only existed because the US acted as enforcer. If the US ceases to do so, then that international regime ceases to exist. This fact was embodied in the UN security council permanent members with power to veto UN actions, the countries which had a capability to act as world police at the time it was founded. But more than that, the UN has no forces of its own, it can only borrow soldiers from members. So again, it totally relies upon agreement to act to enforce any sort of rules. Its not really a rules based system but an application of might makes right.
As to Israel, the only way to have prevented its invasion of its neighbours would have been to send troops to fight Israeli troops. Who would do this? That the US has continued to support Israel may well simply be because the US thinks it better to stay friendly with Israel when there is nothing whatever it can realistically do to stop it invading its neighbours.
Similarly, many states engage in warfare without risk of reprisals, because they have the aid of one or other real power. And lesser actors carry on regardless, because no one is willing to send troops to die to fix a problem. The recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were frankly quite pointless, in that as soon as the occupying troops departed these countries went back to business as before. Thats the thing about empires, they require constant effort to maintain. The US is at a point in history it no longer wants to do this. In the past it tried to use economic force, but China in particular is probably more powerful in this respect now than the US. Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine have to a significant degree simply been thwarted by China.
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