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Post by alec on Sept 21, 2023 19:07:38 GMT
Not so sure about any end point in the Ukraine war. Part of me thinks Russia is so weakened that Ukraine will eventually roll them out completely. They can't even control the seas and have lost air defence capabilities deep inside their own country, even while Ukraine knocks most of their cruise missiles out of the sky.
The Russian army has issued 250,000 certificates to families of bereaved soldiers, according to leaks from Russia, and they are so weakened regionally that they have just abandoned entirely their military alliance with Armenia after the recent hostilities with Azerbajan. Russia and Armenia are meant to be members of Russia's answer to NATO, but Putin has had to watch the US take the lead in peace initiatives in his own back yard. Unthinkable a year ago.
I don't think folks have quite grasped how weak Russia is now.
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Post by alec on Sept 21, 2023 19:10:36 GMT
Update: reports that Ukraine have finally put armoured vehicles behind the fortified lines in the breach near Verbove. Have seen some conflicting reports on this. It might be a small tester advance, or the sign of something more significant, the significance being that if Ukraine has finally got mobile armoured units in behind the Russian lines, the picture could start changing a lot more rapidly.
One to watch.
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Post by lens on Sept 21, 2023 22:54:11 GMT
Not so sure about any end point in the Ukraine war. Part of me thinks Russia is so weakened that Ukraine will eventually roll them out completely. They can't even control the seas and have lost air defence capabilities deep inside their own country, even while Ukraine knocks most of their cruise missiles out of the sky. ................. I don't think folks have quite grasped how weak Russia is now. It may have come as quite a surprise just how poorly Russia has performed, but I'd say very premature to suggest Ukraine will recapture all territories lost. (Especially Crimea.) If it was a democracy it may be different - but it's not. In a democracy there eventually comes a point where the public mood just tires of deaths and wants out - America in Vietnam being maybe the most obvious example. At the time America pulled out, then if anything they were gaining the military advantage, but the public mood just swung against the human and financial cost. I predict (eventually) a similar thing happened here unless real progress is seen soon. Another interesting comparison is the Korean War. By the time of the Armistice it had developed into an overall fairly static situation, in spite of casualties amongst the forces fighting for the north being many times that of UN forces. But Stalin was quite happy for the situation to continue, as (like Vietnam much later) the mood in the US was turning against the war. In the end, the Armistice only came about largely due to the death of Stalin. (It's quite a turn up for Putin to be asking the DPRK *FOR* arms! In the Korean War it was the other way round - the north supplied with manpower from China, and armaments mostly from the USSR.) OK, there are no Americans fighting in Ukraine, but the financial cost is huge, and for Ukrainians there is the terrible human cost - with Russia having a bigger population, and possibly therefore more able to absorb it's losses. At some point peace is going to have to come via a treaty that is (sort of) acceptable to all. Or maybe "least unacceptable" would be a better way to put it. So what are likely to be the red lines on both sides? For Russia I'd say formal acceptance that Crimea is Russian, end of story. I just don't see Putin allowing Ukraine to regain Crimea, or agree to any treaty where it returned to Ukrainian rule. For Ukraine, I'd say Russian acceptance of a pathway for Ukraine to get EU and NATO membership to stop any rerun in the future, and secure borders as agreed in the treaty. After that, it's the question of where the eastern border gets drawn, and I won't predict that other than to say it's probably why so much effort is going into the fighting at the moment. The best realistic outcome for Russia is probably the current limits of their advance, the best realistic outcome for Crimea being back to the pre-invasion boundaries. Somehow I suspect it's going to end up somewhere between the two. |
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Post by johntel on Sept 22, 2023 13:56:58 GMT
Not so sure about any end point in the Ukraine war. Part of me thinks Russia is so weakened that Ukraine will eventually roll them out completely. They can't even control the seas and have lost air defence capabilities deep inside their own country, even while Ukraine knocks most of their cruise missiles out of the sky. ................. I don't think folks have quite grasped how weak Russia is now. It may have come as quite a surprise just how poorly Russia has performed, but I'd say very premature to suggest Ukraine will recapture all territories lost. (Especially Crimea.) If it was a democracy it may be different - but it's not. In a democracy there eventually comes a point where the public mood just tires of deaths and wants out - America in Vietnam being maybe the most obvious example. At the time America pulled out, then if anything they were gaining the military advantage, but the public mood just swung against the human and financial cost. I predict (eventually) a similar thing happened here unless real progress is seen soon. Another interesting comparison is the Korean War. By the time of the Armistice it had developed into an overall fairly static situation, in spite of casualties amongst the forces fighting for the north being many times that of UN forces. But Stalin was quite happy for the situation to continue, as (like Vietnam much later) the mood in the US was turning against the war. In the end, the Armistice only came about largely due to the death of Stalin. (It's quite a turn up for Putin to be asking the DPRK *FOR* arms! In the Korean War it was the other way round - the north supplied with manpower from China, and armaments mostly from the USSR.) OK, there are no Americans fighting in Ukraine, but the financial cost is huge, and for Ukrainians there is the terrible human cost - with Russia having a bigger population, and possibly therefore more able to absorb it's losses. At some point peace is going to have to come via a treaty that is (sort of) acceptable to all. Or maybe "least unacceptable" would be a better way to put it. So what are likely to be the red lines on both sides? For Russia I'd say formal acceptance that Crimea is Russian, end of story. I just don't see Putin allowing Ukraine to regain Crimea, or agree to any treaty where it returned to Ukrainian rule. For Ukraine, I'd say Russian acceptance of a pathway for Ukraine to get EU and NATO membership to stop any rerun in the future, and secure borders as agreed in the treaty. After that, it's the question of where the eastern border gets drawn, and I won't predict that other than to say it's probably why so much effort is going into the fighting at the moment. The best realistic outcome for Russia is probably the current limits of their advance, the best realistic outcome for Crimea being back to the pre-invasion boundaries. Somehow I suspect it's going to end up somewhere between the two. yes that's how I see it too. Seeing the attack on the HQ of the Black Sea Fleet this morning I can't help reflecting on the parallels with the Crimean War and the siege of Sevastopol. This time it's UK/French Storm Shadows doing the damage rather than the heavy artillery from 170 years ago. |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 2, 2023 9:26:06 GMT
It seems the hype about a Ukrainian breakthrough that was present a week or so ago, has died down. As is often the case in war, fortune can shift rapidly, and it is really only after the smoke has settled that anything like the real picture starts to emerge. Given the likely onset of Rasputitsa, it is now highly unlikely we will see a significant mobile breakout by Ukrainian forces this. The salient east of Robotyne is currently the scene of heavy fighting, and there is evidence that probes by mechanised units to seek a breakthrough were unsuccessful.
Over the summer and into the autumn, a couple of key shifts have occurred. Russia has lost its advantage in artillery, and if being forced to shift its doctrine from blanket artillery to more precise munitions. Conversely, the use of cluster munitions supplied by the US has seen the Ukrainians use artillery more is the style of traditional Russian doctrine. Probably through a more forward deployment of air defences, the Ukrainians have been able to negate the tactical advantage the Russians had using attack helicopters. However, the Russians seem to have been able to compensate for this by the more effective use of drones.
Both sides have been taking heavy casualties, but Ukrainian morale both at the front and amongst the general population appears to remain high. I would expect the Ukrainians to launch an offensive in January when the ground hardens again - and I doubt the deployment of fresh Russian units to the grinder will see much of an increase in their military performance. I think if there is a real chance for Ukraine to win, it will be then. Internationally, politics may not go in Ukraine's favour in '24, and the longer a war attrition continues it is likely to favour Russia just due to numbers.
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Post by johntel on Oct 2, 2023 10:34:13 GMT
It seems the hype about a Ukrainian breakthrough that was present a week or so ago, has died down. As is often the case in war, fortune can shift rapidly, and it is really only after the smoke has settled that anything like the real picture starts to emerge. Given the likely onset of Rasputitsa, it is now highly unlikely we will see a significant mobile breakout by Ukrainian forces this. The salient east of Robotyne is currently the scene of heavy fighting, and there is evidence that probes by mechanised units to seek a breakthrough were unsuccessful.
Over the summer and into the autumn, a couple of key shifts have occurred. Russia has lost its advantage in artillery, and if being forced to shift its doctrine from blanket artillery to more precise munitions. Conversely, the use of cluster munitions supplied by the US has seen the Ukrainians use artillery more is the style of traditional Russian doctrine. Probably through a more forward deployment of air defences, the Ukrainians have been able to negate the tactical advantage the Russians had using attack helicopters. However, the Russians seem to have been able to compensate for this by the more effective use of drones.
Both sides have been taking heavy casualties, but Ukrainian morale both at the front and amongst the general population appears to remain high. I would expect the Ukrainians to launch an offensive in January when the ground hardens again - and I doubt the deployment of fresh Russian units to the grinder will see much of an increase in their military performance. I think if there is a real chance for Ukraine to win, it will be then. Internationally, politics may not go in Ukraine's favour in '24, and the longer a war attrition continues it is likely to favour Russia just due to numbers. My issue is that I can't see what a Ukrainian victory would look like in practice. Probably the best that could be hoped for would be to retake Zaporizhia and Kherson and thus break the land corridor to Crimea. I really don't see any way of taking and holding on to Crimea or Donbas due to resistance from the local population and also the risk of nuclear escalation. Morale and support for the war amongst the general Russian population seems to be just as high as ever, so the chances of a new coup attempt seem low at present. It really doesn't matter exactly where the eventual border is drawn. So long as Ukraine joins NATO and gets the security guarantees it needs their people will be able to slowly get back to normal life. The sooner serious negotiations begin the more lives will be saved. |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 2, 2023 10:57:42 GMT
My issue is that I can't see what a Ukrainian victory would look like in practice. Probably the best that could be hoped for would be to retake Zaporizhia and Kherson and thus break the land corridor to Crimea. I really don't see any way of taking and holding on to Crimea or Donbas due to resistance from the local population and also the risk of nuclear escalation. Morale and support for the war amongst the general Russian population seems to be just as high as ever, so the chances of a new coup attempt seem low at present. It really doesn't matter exactly where the eventual border is drawn. So long as Ukraine joins NATO and gets the security guarantees it needs their people will be able to slowly get back to normal life. The sooner serious negotiations begin the more lives will be saved. . as is the case with all wars, the settlement will reflect the military reality on the ground at the point the conflict ends. Control of an area will rest with one on the ground with a gun in their hand.
There are still a number of scenarios one can envisage, which includes the possibility of a Russian collapse and rout. I'm sure in such as event, those of Russian ethnicity most involved with the Russian occupation would flee with the Russian forces. I don't think its beyond all possibility that the Ukrainians could recapture all their lost territory (although I would agree its not the most likely outcome). What would happen after that in terms of the extent of local unrest/resistance, one can only speculate.
I think the pressure on Ukraine to negotiate is going to increase in the coming months, with the period Jan-mar offering the best opportunity for them to optimise their position prior to a settlement. |
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Post by lens on Oct 2, 2023 23:36:51 GMT
It seems the hype about a Ukrainian breakthrough that was present a week or so ago, has died down. As is often the case in war, fortune can shift rapidly, and it is really only after the smoke has settled that anything like the real picture starts to emerge. Given the likely onset of Rasputitsa, it is now highly unlikely we will see a significant mobile breakout by Ukrainian forces this. The salient east of Robotyne is currently the scene of heavy fighting, and there is evidence that probes by mechanised units to seek a breakthrough were unsuccessful.
Over the summer and into the autumn, a couple of key shifts have occurred. Russia has lost its advantage in artillery, and if being forced to shift its doctrine from blanket artillery to more precise munitions. Conversely, the use of cluster munitions supplied by the US has seen the Ukrainians use artillery more is the style of traditional Russian doctrine. Probably through a more forward deployment of air defences, the Ukrainians have been able to negate the tactical advantage the Russians had using attack helicopters. However, the Russians seem to have been able to compensate for this by the more effective use of drones.
Both sides have been taking heavy casualties, but Ukrainian morale both at the front and amongst the general population appears to remain high. I would expect the Ukrainians to launch an offensive in January when the ground hardens again - and I doubt the deployment of fresh Russian units to the grinder will see much of an increase in their military performance. I think if there is a real chance for Ukraine to win, it will be then. Internationally, politics may not go in Ukraine's favour in '24, and the longer a war attrition continues it is likely to favour Russia just due to numbers. My issue is that I can't see what a Ukrainian victory would look like in practice. Probably the best that could be hoped for would be to retake Zaporizhia and Kherson and thus break the land corridor to Crimea. I really don't see any way of taking and holding on to Crimea or Donbas due to resistance from the local population and also the risk of nuclear escalation. Morale and support for the war amongst the general Russian population seems to be just as high as ever, so the chances of a new coup attempt seem low at present. It really doesn't matter exactly where the eventual border is drawn. So long as Ukraine joins NATO and gets the security guarantees it needs their people will be able to slowly get back to normal life. The sooner serious negotiations begin the more lives will be saved. Yes, I fully and totally agree with johntel . I don't want to say it, but I just don't see either side "winning" in the sense that (say) the two World Wars were "won", which usually implies unconditional surrender by the losing side. It comes down to red lines, and as said before, I suspect Russia's red line would be holding on to Crimea. For Ukraine, any peace to include Russian agreement of Ukraine having an agreed pathway to join NATO (and probably eventually the EU) to stop any future rerun of such a conflict. And in the middle, the big question being where the eastern border of Ukraine gets drawn, and which is probably why both sides are showing little signs of getting round a negotiating table at the moment. I suspect both sides currently see being the first to agree to such as being a sign of weakness which will go badly for them in any such negotiations. For Russia, it seems obvious that the war - sorrey, "special military operation" - has not gone remotely how they hoped it would at the start. Equally, they have gained control of - and are holding - substantial amounts of territory in the east, including long stretches of coastline. The eventual outcome may be determined far more by the forthcoming US presidential election, than any near term action on the battleground......... (Never forget that the end of the Korean War only came about because of the death of Stalin, if he'd lived longer it would have almost certainly gone on much longer.) |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 3, 2023 10:56:24 GMT
Hi lens , I think there is a lot of truth in the points both you and johntel make. My point essentially is that the scenario that leads to a 'Ukrainian win' - either in lesser terms regaining of all territory lost since last year, or full win recapture of all territory lost since 2014, requires the collapses of the Russian military at the front to occur. The conditions for this to materialise seem most likely early '24 - if Russia can survive that period, then as I have mentioned before, this conflict has many similarities with the Iran/Iraq war, which dragged on for 8 years.
(Never forget that the end of the Korean War only came about because of the death of Stalin, if he'd lived longer it would have almost certainly gone on much longer.) - well, as I'm sure you know, technically the Korean War hasn't ended.
Currently, there seems little evidence to suggest that either side is willing to start negotiations. The Ukrainians will want to push their advantage, and Russia still seems to hold out expectations that some of their initial war aims can still be achieved. Ukraine is dependent on its western allies, two of its most staunch ones are likely to have GE's in the autumn of '24. The UK are very unlikely to change its stance as a result of a Lab gvt, but may for financial reasons be forced to reduce its levels of aid. The US, rather surprisingly, looks like it might despite everything, elect Trump again. It seems highly unlikely that Trump will continue Biden's position on Ukraine. This is the biggest threat to Ukraine. Russia is to a large degree hoping/depending on a weakening of western resolve and support in order to meet its objectives.
There is such a high degree of uncertainty concerning so many factors, that a whole range of potential outcomes are still realistically plausible.
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Post by lens on Oct 3, 2023 14:22:43 GMT
Hi lens , I think there is a lot of truth in the points both you and johntel make. My point essentially is that the scenario that leads to a 'Ukrainian win' - either in lesser terms regaining of all territory lost since last year, or full win recapture of all territory lost since 2014, requires the collapses of the Russian military at the front to occur. The conditions for this to materialise seem most likely early '24 - ..........
Hmm, well, "most likely" at the beginning of 2024, maybe...... Personally, (and unfortunately) I just don't see such happening at all. The best I can see is some further Ukrainian gains to improve their bargaining position at what must be eventual negotiations. But if they were to realistically look like threatening Crimea, that may finally be the trigger for limited use of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. But I strongly doubt it will ever get near such a stage. Hi lens , (Never forget that the end of the Korean War only came about because of the death of Stalin, if he'd lived longer it would have almost certainly gone on much longer.) - well, as I'm sure you know, technically the Korean War hasn't ended.
I can claim to have stood next to the table where the armistice was signed, whilst a North Korean official lectured us about how it was where the "cowardly Americans signed their surrender, and did it under the UN flag because they were too ashamed to do it under the American flag". For reasons of tact, it was thought wise not to correct him, and point out that in the south it was actually a UN army (not just US) acting under UN authority. Neither was it thought wise to correct his point about it having been the Americans who had started it, but never mind! But yes, you are correct, technically the war hasn't ended. But had it not been for the death of Stalin, even a ceasefire and armistice would not have been signed when it was - the real fighting would have continued. It's an example of how something unforeseen can change everything around. And whilst we know the US election will happen, the outcome isn't known, yet could highly influence what happens in Ukraine. Hi lens , There is such a high degree of uncertainty concerning so many factors, that a whole range of potential outcomes are still realistically plausible.
I won't disagree with that - but equally some of the potential outcomes I find highly, highly unlikely. And Ukraine regaining Crimea is one I'd put towards the top of the list. |
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Post by Deleted on Oct 3, 2023 15:12:28 GMT
My issue is that I can't see what a Ukrainian victory would look like in practice. Probably the best that could be hoped for would be to retake Zaporizhia and Kherson and thus break the land corridor to Crimea. I really don't see any way of taking and holding on to Crimea or Donbas due to resistance from the local population and also the risk of nuclear escalation. Morale and support for the war amongst the general Russian population seems to be just as high as ever, so the chances of a new coup attempt seem low at present. It really doesn't matter exactly where the eventual border is drawn. So long as Ukraine joins NATO and gets the security guarantees it needs their people will be able to slowly get back to normal life. The sooner serious negotiations begin the more lives will be saved. The military situation is so complex and unknown to most of us that armchair analysis seems pointless. Save that its seems clear that Russian minefields and defensive lines have made the more gung ho forecasts look silly. Too many variables , both on and off the battlefield to forecast anything. I would offer thoughts on your NATO comment. This seems really problematic to me-a real Catch 22. Ukraine cannot join Nato whilst it is occupied and at war. To join NATO surely the alliance has to know what borders it is guaranteeing to defend. Putin went to war to stop Ukraine joining NATO after his puppet President ran away. So presumably Putin will not concede anything which facilitates NATO membership for Ukraine. So to join NATO, Ukraine has to redraw its borders around unoccupied Ukraine. Is Zelensky going to do that ? What is the point of the counteroffensive. ? And when you consider that Ukraine is only sustainable as a free entity with continued western support, I wonder how on earth the political leaders responsible for funding it ,are assessing the future of that support. |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 3, 2023 16:00:06 GMT
Hi lens , But if they were to realistically look like threatening Crimea, that may finally be the trigger for limited use of tactical battlefield nuclear weapons.I've previously raised the point/possibility of the use of battlefield nukes and where their usage sits in terms of Russian doctrine. I recently listened to an interview with retired US general Ben Hodges, which prompted me to re-think the extent to which we in the west are deterring ourselves by over emphasises this in our thinking - when in reality the likelihood of it happening is very remote. It is highly unlikely that China will support Russia using them, and given the nature of the conflict, the disposition of forces and the proximity to Russia proper itself, it is very doubtful the Russians would sue them.
Hodges also made the valid point that Washington hasn't been clear on what its objective actually are, and decision makers are hampered by over thinking the geo-political ramifications of certain scenarios.
If you are interested:www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMt4ITohA7U
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Post by birdseye on Oct 9, 2023 20:32:13 GMT
It was some years ago that the Russians officially junked the ban on "first use" of nuclear weapons so they dont need a nuclear attack to deploy them. Their pretext would be " a threat to the existence of Russia" something which Putin already insist is real. What I believe is holding them back is the effect their use would have on the support they are still getting from some other countries. Plus I dont think that they even need such weapons to win against a much smaller country that does not have the ability to hit back.
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Post by lens on Oct 10, 2023 11:41:25 GMT
Their pretext would be " a threat to the existence of Russia" something which Putin already insist is real. And this is why I think Crimea - and if such was ever threatened by Ukraine - could be perceived as such a threat. Not that I see such a scenario - and hence their use - likely. It's proving a far more costly war than Russia could ever have imagined, but there's a huge way to go before Ukraine is even close to threatening Crimea. And I also suspect even Zelensky must know in his heart of hearts that Crimea is lost. Not that I would expect him to admit such any time soon. But eventually this war is going to have to end with negotiations and that will be the time for realism on both sides. Until then, expect both sides to make bold claims. I'll stick my neck out, and suggest we're likely to see at least another year of war, then both sides looking for a settlement. With the weather turning, I don't expect much change before the spring, then let's see what happens when conditions improve again. If 2024 doesn't bring a big change in the stalemate - and I don't think it will - that's when thoughts may turn to negaotiations and compromises. But I reserve the right to be completely wrong........  |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 24, 2023 9:20:06 GMT
It increasingly looks like the conflict may be gearing up for some form of negotiated settlement in 2024. The Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to either create any form of breakthrough of the Russian lines, or 'break' the Russian army itself. The Ukrainian strategy has been to try and stretch Russian defences to create gaps that can then be exploited. Some Western analyst/supporters have been frustrated with the Ukrainian approach, arguing that they should have concentrated their own forces to attempt a punch through of the Russians lines. However, both the experiences of the Russians and Ukrainians in attacking indicate that that route was not really an option.
The current Russian assault around Avdiivka, was initial assessed as a Russian attempt to hold down Ukrainian forces. However, the investment the Russian's are making and losses they seem willing to sustain, indicate that they are committed to taking the town. To do this now, when their resources could be better placed to absorb/thwart Ukrainian probes, probably means they want to achieve this objective prior to negotiations. The pattern of the conflict is very much one of attrition and stalemate at this stage, and this recent assault signals that even with the losses Russia has sustained it can still launch offensive operations.
I still think we will see a big Ukrainian push in the winter, and while there is a possibility that it could prove successful, it is most likely to have a result is a similar outcome to this year's offensive. If that is the result, then by Easter, with the distinct possibility of a Trump presidency round the corner, I think negotiations will start up.
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Post by johntel on Oct 29, 2023 17:43:02 GMT
Much as I hate to say it, I think Lukashenko is right:
"Russia and Ukraine are locked in a stalemate on the frontlines of their war and the two sides need to sit down and negotiate an end to the conflict, the authoritarian leader of Belarus has said. Alexander Lukashenko, who is an ally of Russian president Vladimir Putin, described the current state of the conflict as “head-to-head, to the death, entrenched. People are dying”.
“There are enough problems on both sides and in general the situation is now seriously stalemate: no one can do anything and substantively strengthen or advance their position,” he said." (from the Guardian).
In the meantime it seems that Avdiivka may be strategically more important than pro-Ukraine commentators are admitting:
From the Sunday Times:
"Russian victory in Avdiivka would “lock Ukraine out” of the southern Donbas, warns Michael Clarke, distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and visiting professor in defence studies at King’s College London, in the Sunday Times:
Russia’s renewed attack at Avdiivka, which began on the weekend of October 7, is particularly significant. The Russians have diverted scarce resources to try, yet again, to surround the city, bringing in about six brigades and a great deal of air power and artillery from other units, bombarding the two Ukrainian brigades holding the city. So far, Ukrainian forces have defended the town fiercely and the Russians have not completed an encirclement — though they will keep trying.
Avdiivka is becoming another Bakhmut. Except that Bakhmut had no real strategic importance. It was a symbol the Wagner mercenaries wanted to create for themselves. But Avdiivka does have genuine strategic value: it is on a key route into the city of Donetsk, as close to the airport as it is to the northern suburbs of the city.
The road system makes Avdiivka the gateway to southern Donbas. The Ukrainians have held it against Russian pressure since last year. It is Kyiv’s route to victory in that sector. If they lose Avdiivka now, they will be locked out of the south, and most of what they have achieved in the Donbas further north will count for little. Ukraine’s 1st Tank Brigade has been brought in to defend Avdiivka, while parts of the hard-fighting 47th Mechanised Brigade have been pulled out of the main southerly thrust from Zaporizhzhia and sent east to help defend the city. Fierce battles have been going on for control of the coke and chemicals plant on Avdiivka’s northern flank and the sand quarry at the village of Opytne on the southern flank. These two miserable industrial sites really matter."
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Oct 30, 2023 15:43:24 GMT
Hi johntel , In the meantime it seems that Avdiivka may be strategically more important than pro-Ukraine commentators are admitting:Whilst one can clearly criticise the tactics that the Russian military employs to achieve its objectives, one should be wary of discounting them as irrational, incompetent and mindless. There is a logical rational to all that they do.
RE Lukashenko comments, that signals the Russians are looking for a negotiated settlement/ceasefire next year, and supports the point I made about them being motivated atm by a desire to tidy up the front line. This (cessation of hostilities) will likely suit the US geo-politically given what's happening in the ME, and Biden domestically in the lead up to the elections.
This may be a bitter pill for the Ukrainians to swallow, and Zelenskiy may not survive politically, but the cost of dislodging the Russians looks like it may be beyond what Kyiv is capable of and Washington is willing to spend. The alternative looks like another 2-3 years of attritional warfare.
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Post by johntel on Oct 30, 2023 17:48:06 GMT
Hi johntel , In the meantime it seems that Avdiivka may be strategically more important than pro-Ukraine commentators are admitting:Whilst one can clearly criticise the tactics that the Russian military employs to achieve its objectives, one should be wary of discounting them as irrational, incompetent and mindless. There is a logical rational to all that they do.
RE Lukashenko comments, that signals the Russians are looking for a negotiated settlement/ceasefire next year, and supports the point I made about them being motivated atm by a desire to tidy up the front line. This (cessation of hostilities) will likely suit the US geo-politically given what's happening in the ME, and Biden domestically in the lead up to the elections.
This may be a bitter pill for the Ukrainians to swallow, and Zelenskiy may not survive politically, but the cost of dislodging the Russians looks like it may be beyond what Kyiv is capable of and Washington is willing to spend. The alternative looks like another 2-3 years of attritional warfare. Yes , but I'm still hopeful that Zelenskiy will prove to be a true leader and will convince his people to accept a far less than perfect solution, but one that will lead to a stable peace. There were signs early on in the war (admittedly when things weren't going so well for Ukraine) that he was willing to give up the claim to Crimea which is they key to starting any meaningful negotiations. The prize of a secure future in NATO and the EU is surely worth the cost of ceding territory which otherwise would always be a nightmare to control anyway. |
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Post by Deleted on Nov 3, 2023 9:26:17 GMT
UKraine's Commander in Chief explaining in detail why and how the war has reached stalemate. www.economist.com/europe/2023/11/01/ukraines-commander-in-chief-on-the-breakthrough-he-needs-to-beat-russiaHis concluding remarks are sobering :- "a long war favours Russia, which has a population three times and an economy ten times the size of Ukraine. “Let’s be honest, it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life. And for us…the most expensive thing we have is our people,” he says. For now he has enough soldiers. But the longer the war goes on, the harder it will be to sustain. “We need to look for this solution, we need to find this gunpowder, quickly master it and use it for a speedy victory. Because sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight.” The "gunpowder" he refers to is the technology to break through Russian minefields. |
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Post by alec on Nov 3, 2023 15:42:45 GMT
colin - "The "gunpowder" he refers to is the technology to break through Russian minefields." Some of these are starting to appear - Ukraine is also waging a war for hearts and minds. This involves hyping up the Russian threat (it is big anyway, but you know what I mean) stressing the chance of failure for Ukraine, and then highlighting specific weapons systems that they _really need_ for their survival. Interestingly, quite often these specific and alarming calls for specific equipment come after they have actually got their hands on some of it, so the next stage is using these things successfully and generating the image of the plucky Ukrainians punching above their weight. Everyone loves a winner.
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Post by Deleted on Nov 3, 2023 17:18:03 GMT
Yes-you have been trailing the imminent collapse of Russian forces for some time now I recall. |
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Post by johntel on Nov 16, 2023 8:07:28 GMT
From today's ISW report:
Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations. The Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organization – reported on October 31 that 55 percent of respondents to a recent poll believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war.[13]
The Levada Center observed that while these numbers slightly increased between September and October by four percent, they have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[14] The Levada Center added that support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine remained high with 76 percent of respondents stating that they support Russian military operations in Ukraine.
The Levada Center reported that 62 percent of surveyed Russians believe that the full-scale invasion is progressing well, while 21 percent of respondents believe that the war is going reasonably or very poorly for Russia.[15] The Levada Center reported on November 14 that two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is headed in the right direction and of those who believe the opposite, 45 percent cited the war in Ukraine.[16] Opposition-leaning Russian research organization Russian Field reported similar numbers supporting negotiations on November 15, noting that 48 percent of respondents said that Russia should engage in peace negotiations and that 74 percent would support Russian President Vladimir Putin if he signed a peace agreement “tomorrow.”[17] Russian Field stated that 36 percent of respondents believe that the war is going well for Russia whereas 25 percent believe that the war is going poorly for Russia and that respondents who trust Telegram channels are twice as likely to believe that the war is going poorly for Russia as those who rely on Russian television.[18]
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Post by Deleted on Dec 13, 2023 11:48:56 GMT
Zelensky's trip to USA to try and unlock the next round of support must have left him feeling very queezy . " For as long as we can" is very different to " for as long as it takes" :- news.sky.com/story/biden-promises-ukraine-support-for-as-long-as-we-can-but-subtle-language-change-will-make-zelenskyy-shudder-13029224The recent WSJ OP must have filled him with horror:- www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trump-takes-2024-lead-as-biden-approval-hits-new-low-wsj-poll-finds-fb4fca0cWith the war at stalemate ... www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2023/11/13/the-war-in-ukraine-may-be-heading-for-stalemate.....a 2024 in which US help dries up-or is abandoned entirely ( Presidential Election on November 5) would see UKraine facing catastrophe. And with it, the defence of Europe would move centre stage. Even if one puts to the side ,the awful prospect of a US withdrawal from NATO, a Europe rapidly trying to adjust to a Russian advance on its eastern borders whilst contemplating the inadequacy of its preparedness is not a comforting thought ... www.thetimes.co.uk/article/german-military-cant-defend-against-russia-says-army-chief-rcw6wfnqhPerhaps another "solution" is appearing in the EU though ? Roger Boyes in today's Times explains it thus :- "Almost all of the leaders at this week’s summit have their eyes on next June’s European parliamentary elections and the racing certainty that the far right will gobble up votes." "Anti-immigration groupings are mushrooming in France, Italy, Hungary. Geert Wilders’s militantly anti-Islam Freedom Party won 23.6 per cent of the vote in last month’s Dutch elections, doubling his party’s seat tally. In Germany the Alternative for Germany is systematically sweeping up seats in regional parliaments. There have been riots in Ireland, fights in the normally placid Czech Republic between local Roma gangs and Ukrainians. The mood of voters is souring. The centre-right, which should be engaged in thinking up ways to steer societies from a polycrisis, is trying instead to steal the clothes of the far right. It is a failing stratagem. Macron’s latest immigration bill, promising faster expulsion of unsuccessful asylum seekers, curbs on migrants bringing dependants into the country but also the legalisation of undocumented migrants who work in understaffed industries, has been shot down as inadequate by the far right and as callous by the left. In Denmark, meanwhile, ruling Social Democrats have authorised the use of bulldozers to knock down ageing housing estates on the grounds that “non-western” migrants living there are creating crime-prone parallel societies. There’s little doubt that both large-scale migration and faltering integration stir communal tensions across Europe. Votes are likely to shift away from the centre to the radical right. Or the mainstream parties will have to toughen up." " "What happens if a re-elected Trump quits Nato? And where does European security go if Ukraine loses the war? It is not impossible to imagine a reverse-ferret, a collective appeasement of Russia." No wonder the very down to earth " Centrist Dad " Andrew Marr has turned his back on rejoining the EU. @ 5.16 on this :- www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVlPZDUPnOMAnd no wonder Starmer's only mention of Brexit in this Buckinghamshire speech was :- " So, if you voted for Brexit seven years ago, if you voted for the Conservatives four years ago, and you’re still waiting for the change you demanded.,....................Then I say again, this is what a changed Labour Party will deliver." |
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Post by Deleted on Dec 14, 2023 10:15:52 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Dec 15, 2023 10:46:54 GMT
More difficult news for Zelensky. Hours after Orban absented himself on an EU vote to start accession proceedings, he vetoed €50bn ($55bn; £43bn) in EU aid for Ukraine.
He kept his fire for what really matters just now for Ukraine. EU membership is a decade away. The aid is needed now.
Ukraine is also desperately awaiting approval of a $61bn US defence aid package - delayed because of disagreements between Democrat and Republican lawmakers. .
Meanwhile UKrainian troops at the front line say it is "like Vietnam"
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Post by Deleted on Dec 15, 2023 11:20:33 GMT
"The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has warned that the United States could pay a "much higher cost" than most people imagine if they allow Russia to win in Ukraine. The non-profit organisation issued a lengthy assessment of what a victory for Vladimir Putin's forces could mean for US, and the West at large. Its analysis omes as Washington remains at an impasse over continuing to fund Kyiv's defence of its territory, with Democrats and Republicans at loggerheads over the issue. The ISW said that if Russia was allowed to win, it would result in the US having to deploy "a sizable portion of its ground forces" and "a large number of stealth aircraft" to Eastern Europe. The institute argues that this decision would likely lead to Washington having to make a "terrible choice" between defending its NATO allies in Europe and protecting Taiwan from Chinese aggression in the Pacific. "The entire undertaking will cost a fortune, and the cost will last as long as the Russian threat continues—potentially indefinitely," the ISW says. It adds: "Helping Ukraine keep the lines where they are through continuous Western military support is far more advantageous and cheaper for the United States than allowing Ukraine to lose. "'Freezing' the conflict is worse than continuing to help Ukraine fight—that would simply give Russia time and space to prepare for a renewed war to conquer Ukraine and confront NATO. "Helping Ukraine regain control of all or most of its territory would be much more advantageous, as it would drive Russian forces even further to the east. "Best of all, supporting Ukraine to its victory and then helping it rebuild would put the largest and most combat-effective friendly military on the European continent at the forefront of the defence of NATO, whether Ukraine does or does not ultimately join the alliance." Sky News No wonder Poland is reading the tea leaves :- dsm.forecastinternational.com/2023/08/30/poland-proposes-double-digit-2024-budgetary-increase-for-defense/Will Tusk change course ? :- www.politico.eu/article/poland-incoming-government-siemoniak-wont-cancel-pricey-defense-contracts-military-position/ |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Dec 15, 2023 17:56:32 GMT
Well it looks like the West's timidity/self imposed constraints in relation to supporting to Ukraine are coming home to roost. The naivety of those who thought Russia would just collapse is becoming clear. In a war of attrition Russia has the advantage unless the West provides Ukraine with the means to obtain and maintain air superiority.
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Post by Deleted on Dec 19, 2023 14:31:56 GMT
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jan 19, 2024 10:01:40 GMT
Its quite predictable that Western interest/focus on Ukraine would fade overtime. The West seem willing to allow/tolerate the current virtual stalemate and and grinding war of attrition - one which inherently favours Russia. Both sides appear to be short on manpower, and lack the capability to launch significant offensives. I thought there was a possibility that the Ukrainians had been holding back reserves for an offensive when the ground freezes, but there is little evidence to support this. Worryingly, Russia appears to have retained/regained its edge in regards to artillery.
One cant see a scenario by which either side wins a military victory this year, with the most decisive factor in the conflict likely to be the result of the US elections. The continuation of the conflict means that the international system will continue to destabilise, a dangerous state of affairs which could have many unforeseen consequences.
I think a Trump victory would precipitate a negotiated end to the conflict, but it would be with an outcome that is detrimental to the longer term interest of the West. I'm fairly sure it is what Putin is holding out for. I have no clear indication of what approach Haley would adopt (I suspect it would be fairly similar to Biden's).
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Post by alec on Jan 19, 2024 13:32:01 GMT
colin & lululemonmustdobetter - we do seem to be at a critical point in the war, both on the battlefield and in western governments. There isn't much sign of Europe easing up, with Germany putting in around 5 times more per capita than the UK now, and many of the eastern states digging in. It all comes down to the reluctance by some in the Biden administration to stop delaying the necessary equipment. On the battlefield, I've read recent (this week) reports that Ukraine is still destroying Russian equipment at a hell of a rate, equivalent to the ratio that Israel achieved in the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Last week Ukraine also shot down an A-50 AWACS plane over the Sea of Azov, which is actually quite astonishing, and in the last couple of days it has emerged that Ukrainian grain exports are now close to pre war levels, such has been their ability to negate the seaborne threat of the Russian navy. And I don't think the F16s have been deployed yet. It's just so frustrating that Biden is pissing around and doesn't seem to recognise that a fast resolution of the war is in the wests best interests, and for that he needs to park his reluctance to offer the weapons systems needed.
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