pjw1961
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Post by pjw1961 on Dec 10, 2022 23:20:10 GMT
Further to my earlier (edited) post from John Curry, unsurprisingly his comments have created some reaction. This time I will reproduce his defence of his ideas in full. By the way if the term 'wargaming' puts anyone off, think of it as 'conflict simulation'.
"Wargames are a way of including consideration of time, space, terrain, weather, ORBATs, logistics into a single model. Wargaming as a methodology is a challenge to the traditional narrative analysis of war that appears in the media; to me the former consistently out performs the latter. That is why the computer industry uses models such as UML to describe how system work instead of just essays. We can model in the face of unknowns, however one should always be aware of this uncertainty.
My value, if any, to the wargaming community, is my application of the academic method to validate assumptions. I was the one who wrote the referred journal article that wargaming was an essential but flawed tool. I analysed classified professional wargaming rules written during the Cold War and demonstrated that they included major errors. (This was not the fault of the wargamers, but of the operational analysis the games were based on). As you can imagine the presentation of this at professional wargaming conferences in the UK and USA and Australia was not well received by all. However, despite my reputation for seeking evidence, people still want to talk to me.
My initial wargame, despite uncertainties, was the only one I know of that predicted the failure of the initial Russian invasion. However, it should be noted that I upset some supporters of the narrative of “Ukraine tactical brilliance v Russian incompetence” with my conclusion that both sides were not very good at war; the campaign stalled due to geography and logistics. I did tactical analysis of enough video footage of combat to demonstrate neither side was well trained at that stage.
Wargames allow one to experiment. So I played with the ORBATs and I found that Russia needed 300% more aircraft committed to the campaign, 500% more PGMs and 800% more airborne forces in order to take eastern Ukraine within in weeks.
As for sources, I read NATO sources, but I am not using them. I have other sources. I am always seeking metrics to inform my wargames e.g. rates of advance, casualty rates, tank repair rates etc.. e.g. a generalisation is that artillery shells land on average 300 metres from their target. This is due to the largely worn-out barrels on both sides- no-one expected artillery barrels to be used to fire so many shells. This means that maths indicates it takes perhaps 100 shells to hit a particular trench. That is a lot of shells when one needs to keep moving locations due to counter battery fire (such as drones/ missile strikes).
To be clear, my income is not dependent on me saying what people want to hear. My efforts are not western propaganda, I doubt anyone knows I exist outside of the wargaming world. And I might be completely wrong. The future is not yet written, both Ukraine and Russia can do things that means the Russian army does not break by the end of the winter. If I am wrong I will happily admit it, then analyse why, then inform my future practice."
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johntel
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Post by johntel on Dec 11, 2022 18:42:47 GMT
Ukraine has hit concentrations of Wagner Group in both Melitopol and Luhansk today according to the BBC which hopefully will help make John Curry's predictions become reality.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Dec 12, 2022 11:57:04 GMT
There have started to be reports of Russian troops suffering from cold. Hard to know if that is just propaganda or if this time round, it is Russia unprepared for winter which will face a Ukrainian onslaught once the ground is nicely frozen. There were some other reports alongside a few recent attacks by Ukrane on targets within Russia, that the US has now agreed Ukraine may attack Russia directly. ukraine seems to have a few drones able to do this, but really it needs the US to provide them with long range missiles so they could hit back at the continuining wave of Russian missiles. That is currently what is harming Ukraine most, and the US needs to see it has to do something about this or risk losing.
Biden is presumably well aware how unpopular protracted foreign wars are with the US public and while dems did remarkably well in the recent elections, it was most likely because of republicans having changed the balance of the supreme court. Americans love a divided government and the overturning of roe v wade caused a push back to dems by voters. But mindfull of the next lot of elections, foreign war is bad news. However...allowing Ukraine to be overrun by Russia isnt a good outcome either. Ukraine needs longer range weapons, both to take the war to Russia but also to hit Russian military targets within Ukraine.
Anyway, the winter war doesnt seem to have begun yet. We will see if it marks a new phase, either way of Ukrainian advances or Russian consolidation.
Talk of peace now is a bit of a nonsense. Any truce right now would constitute a victory for russia, with the expectation the war will resume next year, or in 5 years, whatever suits Russia best. That could only be prevented by stationing a large NATO force comparable to the size of the Ukrainian army within Ukraine pointing back at Russian occupied areas. Thats a pretty big commitment. It would probably take the entire Uk army for starters. But that is the sort of scale needed to guarantee a peace held. And that still takes no account of Ukrainian determination to liberate their entire country.
Its clear russia has no interest in the people currently living in Ukraine, and is currently engaging in taking away children of Ukrainians within the captured territory and getting them adopted by Russian families. Ukrainian adults are being forcibly enrolled as russian citizens and being deported to Russia, with trusted Russian citizens being brought in. This means any future referendum of the local population on who they want to belong to would be a complete nonsense because there wont be any Ukrainians left in occupation.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Dec 12, 2022 12:11:14 GMT
Oh, and todays ISW analysis suggests that Russian interest in Belarus isnt so much to try to get belarus to attack Ukraine, because it has very limited forces anyway and it has already stripped their army of much of its equiment to give to Russian soldiers. Rather they suggest the idea is to get Russian troops stationed within Belarus and to long term formally take it over as part of Russia too. Russian expansion goals are not limited to Ukraine.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Jan 4, 2023 1:35:30 GMT
War in Ukraine seems to be something of a stalemate at the moment, though depends how you look at it. It seems Russia is losing troops faster than Ukraine, but it also apparently seems to be preparing for another draft. Its tactics are the same as ever, throw more men at the problem and hope to win by numbers.
Putin continues to make noises suggestive he is preparing to seize assets belonging to anyone not fully compliant with his wishes. Nothing like making the most of a crisis to do something you wanted to do anyway. On the other hand, key cooperative private individuals seem to be still favoured.
One interesting statistic is that Russia is now using shells at 1/4 the rate it was at the start of the war. Some indication supplies are running low.
It seems the ground is still not frozen, so if anyone intends a winter campaign, they are still waiting. However, i read a suggestion the Russians are struggling with the weather. Staying outside to man positions at night is supposedly leading to deaths from hyperthermia, but bringing men in to sleep risks attacks such as that recently, where Ukraine claimed 900 killed or injured at a base not too far behind the lines. (the noteable success seems to have been due to them igniting Russian ammunition stocks)
Further anti missile systems continue to arrive in Ukraine, but some seem to wonder just why they weren't sent six months ago. And why equipment which will be sent in six months time isnt arriving now. Plus of course the need for long range weapons to strike both deep behind russian lines, and into russia. If Russia was suffereing infrastructure losses like Ukraine, this war would be over.
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Mr Poppy
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Post by Mr Poppy on Jan 4, 2023 2:42:37 GMT
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jan 27, 2023 10:49:11 GMT
Concerning the recent decision by Germany to allow Leopard II tanks to be deployed, I think one element of the decision/delay in agreeing to the move that hasn't been covered in the press possible concerns as to their actual efficacy and the risk as to their vulnerability on the battlefield.
In the past two conflicts which have seen the mass deployment of heavy western armour in mobile warfare, both Iraq wars, the western forces had total air superiority. Currently, Ukraine, does not posses this. Unsurprisingly, immediately after Washington made the decision to send Abrams tanks, Kiev started to push for F-16s. Armour is vulnerable from the air.
The start of the war, with the images of many burnt out tanks and the success of anti-tank missiles donated by the west against Russian armour, prompted much discussion around the obsolescence of tanks. Whilst many did eventually come to the conclusion that the poor performance of tanks in the early stages of the war had much more to do with floors in Russian tactics and opps, it still highlighted the extent to which anti-tank weapons have progressed. The Russians do possess anti-tank weapons that are capable of taking out Abrams and leopard II tanks, such as the Kornet EM en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9M133_Kornet#:~:text=The%209M133%20Kornet%20(Russian%3A%20%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%82,the%20Russian%20army%20in%201998. Kornets were credited with knocking out two Abrams tanks in Iraq war, Hezbollah knocked out 4 Israeli Merkava tanks with them, and reportedly ISIL used them to destroy 6 Turkish Leopard II tanks.
Therefore, their deployment is not without risk and they are not an indestructible force that will by themselves secure victory for Ukraine. The propaganda angle for Russia of knocking out Western tanks may be one that was influencing the Germans. Also, the nature in which they will be deployed on the battlefield may have been a concern. A possible scenario for an escalation is the use of tactical battlefield nukes by the Russians. Russian military doctrine is to use them against concentrations of enemy forces that are threatening to overwhelm their position - a large concentration of mechanized forces and armour by the Ukrainians to achieve a large scale breakthrough and encirclement of Russian would theoretically trigger this. However, personally I think this unlikely to happen but it may have been a risk the Germans were considering. In reality the nature of their deployment will probably be that they are used primarily to gain a local tactical advantage rather than being massed for a big breakthrough. However, as noted above, unlike the Himars, the Russian's do potentially posses counters to this weapon system.
While I wholeheartedly agree with the decision to send them, I think expectations need to be tempered in terms of the overall impact they will have, especially in the short term as it will take time to put in place the logistic support to allow them to operate as well as train Ukrainian personnel in their use and integrate them into their formations.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Jan 30, 2023 11:30:27 GMT
Therefore, their deployment is not without risk and they are not an indestructible force that will by themselves secure victory for Ukraine. No indeed, and they need more like 3000 rather than 300 or the uk donation of 12. However, this has formed part of the ongoing Ukrainian publicity campaign where they take whatever critical area happens to be in play at the time, and publicly ask the west to help. We had rocket launchers, air defence systems and now tanks. Others too. Each forming part of the message that Ukraine needs more weapons. I'd agree with you modern tanks have probably been hyped in terms of their performance gains over old tanks, just as happens with every other item we make. I'd suspect though Russia already has comprehensive data on western equipment. They arent going to do that, because we would shoot back. No one -ever- wins by giving in to threats. If we dont care Russia occupies Ukraine, then just let Russia have it. But I think our overwhelming interest is to throw them out of Ukraine. Especially considering its potential mineral wealth, and not inconsiderable strategic food supplies. I do not believe Putin thinks Ukraine is somehow an inalienable part of Russia. He thinks it has critical commodity reserves Russia has to take. I have hard it said that if Russia used battlefield nuclear weapons, given their general state of training it would probably cause more problems for Russian troops than Ukrainian. I heard a suggestion that despite a decision in principle to send Abrahams tanks, it might be a year before they reach the battlefield. An excellent example of hoping the war will be over before they need to be used. |
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johntel
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Post by johntel on Apr 24, 2023 15:41:15 GMT
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Post by johntel on May 11, 2023 21:42:40 GMT
It looks like today's announcement about the UK supplying Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine was timed to coincide with an increase in offensive activity across the southern front line which is making the Russians very jittery about their ability to defend Crimea. Of course this may be a diversionary tactic and the real breakthrough effort will be elsewhere.
SIMFEROPOL, May 11 - RIA Novosti Crimea. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied reports of a successful offensive by Ukrainian troops in the special operation zone, the press service of the defense department reported on Thursday evening.
Earlier, a number of journalists and Telegram channels reported on the activity of the Ukrainian military in different sectors of the front. In particular, military commander Yevgeny Poddubny announced the actions of Ukrainian troops in the Kupyansk direction, as well as a possible increase in their efforts in the south.
"Statements circulated by individual telegram channels about "defense breakthroughs" that took place in various sections of the line of contact do not correspond to reality," the Defense Ministry said in a statement.
According to the Ministry of Defense, as of 22:00 on May 11, active operations were not being carried out in the Kupyansk direction; during the day, the actions of three enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups were stopped.
On the Krasno-Limansky Front, two attacks by company tactical groups of the enemy in the areas of Kremennaya and Chervona Dibrova were repulsed.
In the Donetsk direction, three attempts by the enemy to conduct reconnaissance in force were thwarted, and eight attacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the positions of Russian troops were successfully repelled.
"Assault detachments continue to liberate the western part of Artemovsk with the support of aviation and artillery. The units of the "Southern" group of troops are actively engaged in blocking Avdiivka and capturing Maryinka. Currently, a battle is underway to repel an attack by a unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the direction of Maloilyinovka. Army and attack aircraft are involved, as well as artillery. The enemy suffers significant losses in manpower and equipment," the ministry said.
There are no active operations in the Zaporozhye and Kherson directions. The general situation in the NWO zone is under control.
Earlier, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksiy Danilov admitted that the Krajina side does not yet have a specific offensive plan , even the timing and direction of the strike have not been determined.
The Ukrainian command is working on several options that will be used depending on the circumstances. At the same time, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Oleksiy Reznikov said that the expectations from the counter-offensive campaign of Kyiv in the world are overestimated. According to him, most people "expect something big, but this can lead to emotional disappointment."
At the same time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in an interview with the Finnish Yle, said that he believes in the success of the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which allegedly will allow Kiev to "return" Crimea . He believes that the effectiveness of the maneuvers of the Ukrainian army will largely depend on the supply of Western weapons. However, it does not exclude that the conflict may be protracted and last for years or even decades.
In Moscow and Crimea, in response to all the statements of Kyiv and the West, they have repeatedly emphasized that they should not doubt Russia's ability to defend itself. The head of the republic, Sergei Aksyonov, noted that Crimea was ready for any development of the situation, there were enough forces and means to prepare the defense of the peninsula.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 9, 2023 17:02:30 GMT
Like many others, over the past week I have been following sources from both sides very closely (there really are no impartial neutral sources you can rely on). Now obviously its currently impossible to conclude what Ukraine's objectives for their offensive actually is at this stage or whether it will prove successful; however, I think there are some conclusion/observations than can be made:
1) The Ukrainian 'counter-offensive' has started. Which sector(s) they are actually focussing on remains unclear.
2) In regards to the Kakhovka dam there are three possible explanations - a) it was accidental/result of previous damage, b) intentional by Russia to forestall a Ukrainian attack or divert their resources c) intentional by Ukraine to disrupt Russian defences. b) is by far the most likely given the timing, but whether it was based on credible intelligence that the Ukrainians were planning to attack in that sector is unknown.
3) Relative airpower remains a constraint on the Ukrainian forces - it looks like some of their probes were in part repulsed by air-power (fixed wing and attack helicopters).
4) Russian artillery has not been negated as a factor.
5) Overall capability wise, both sides are relatively evenly matched.
As I've commented a number of times before, in terms of relatively recent previous conflicts, the Iran-Iraq war seems the closest comparator. I very much doubt either side will be able to deal a decisive blow to the other this year. The Ukrainian's are completely dependent on aid from the west (economic and material support), and the biggest risk to them is a reduction in the west's commitment to their cause. The most probable outcome currently, looks like some kind of stalemate. Logically, I think the only way this can be changed decisively in Ukraine's favour, is by a significant shift in terms of greater support for them from the West, potentially involving direct intervention and calling Putin's bluff.
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Post by leftieliberal on Jun 9, 2023 17:43:46 GMT
Like many others, over the past week I have been following sources from both sides very closely (there really are no impartial neutral sources you can rely on). Now obviously its currently impossible to conclude what Ukraine's objectives for their offensive actually is at this stage or whether it will prove successful; however, I think there are some conclusion/observations than can be made:
1) The Ukrainian 'counter-offensive' has started. Which sector(s) they are actually focussing on remains unclear.
2) In regards to the Kakhovka dam there are three possible explanations - a) it was accidental/result of previous damage, b) intentional by Russia to forestall a Ukrainian attack or divert their resources c) intentional by Ukraine to disrupt Russian defences. b) is by far the most likely given the timing, but whether it was based on credible intelligence that the Ukrainians were planning to attack in that sector is unknown.
3) Relative airpower remains a constraint on the Ukrainian forces - it looks like some of their probes were in part repulsed by air-power (fixed wing and attack helicopters).
4) Russian artillery has not been negated as a factor.
5) Overall capability wise, both sides are relatively evenly matched.
As I've commented a number of times before, in terms of relatively recent previous conflicts, the Iran-Iraq war seems the closest comparator. I very much doubt either side will be able to deal a decisive blow to the other this year. The Ukrainian's are completely dependent on aid from the west (economic and material support), and the biggest risk to them is a reduction in the west's commitment to their cause. The most probable outcome currently, looks like some kind of stalemate. Logically, I think the only way this can be changed decisively in Ukraine's favour, is by a significant shift in terms of greater support for them from the West, potentially involving direct intervention and calling Putin's bluff.
So, not accidental as a result of previous damage. The Russians had also allowed the water level behind the dam to reach its highest level www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/09/visual-guide-ukraine-nova-kakhovka-dam-collapse. It does make military sense for the Russians to blow up the dam because it stops any Ukranian attack towards Crimea from Kherson. However if the Ukranian army can reach the sea somewhere near Melitopol they can sever the land link to Crimea and then if they destroy the Kerch bridge, they can starve out the Russians in Crimea. |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 11, 2023 11:11:42 GMT
alec wrote: New poll alert - or thanks to google, perhaps spovishchennya pro nove opytuvannya:Over 80% of Ukrainians oppose territorial concessions to end the war - kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1242&page=1Only 10% think concessions could be made, there is an absolute majority against such concessions in every region, although support for no concessions was lowest in the eastern region (75%, up from 68% in May 22).Caveats: although the sample size looks OK with n=1029, only 19 respondents identified themselves as Russian origin, so there may be some skewing of the sample. Also (my thoughts) presumably the survey doesn't include the areas already occupied by Russia, of which some are more ethnically Russian, so again, some bias likely.But it does give some credence to those who tell western commentators who 'instruct' Ukrainians on how they should end the conflict to listen instead to what the Ukrainians themselves want.Linking to this, I've read (from Ukrainian commentators) of a couple of interesting strategic ideas hat may well be helping to shape the tactical war that I hadn't been aware of previously.Firstly, Ukraine is mounting a broad and shallow attack, hitting Russia across a huge length of the front, but without launching a single, concentrated attack. In part this is likely to have the aim of stretching Russia supply lines, probing for weak points, gathering battlefield intelligence (ie using attacks to find out where Russia positions are located that you hadn't seen before) and also trying to get Russia to move and commit reserves so they can be engaged. But some are also saying a big element is the limitation placed on Ukraine by Russia;s tactical nuclear arsenal. Although they made a complete horlicks of it, Russia was able to amass vast aggregations of armour to punch though in force, but Ukraine can't do that because a large grouping in prone to battlefield nukes, and Russia may not consider that to be an unacceptable escalation.Linked to both that, and the above polling, Ukrainian analysts are also suggesting that the nature of the conflict is categorically different to that face by any recent Nato or other western military mission, where fears of a draining of public support lead military planners towards a massive and rapid deployment, to get the mission completed before the public turn against the war. Here, Ukraine is united and solid, and are prepared for a grinding, long conflict, because they understand that only a defeated Russia, completely expunged from Ukraine, will bring safety.So putting all this together, for both battlefield and political reasons, Ukraine is willing to conduct a wide ranging counter attack, that may take a long time. The polls suggest the public support this.On Ukraine's domestic morale, as is the case in all conflicts that will be prone to erosion over time due to casualties inflicted, economic impact etc. Both sides will have challenges with domestic support for the war effort - and it will be wrong for the west to assume that the Ukrainians will to fight can't be broken - which is even more reason why we should be doing a lot more to help them if we want to make them assured of victory, which includes calling Russia's bluff on issues relating to the level and nature of our support.
The probing nature of the start of the offensive is standard battlefield tactics for a direct offensive on defensive positions. The objective is to get the enemy to commit their reserves and identify the weakest point in their lines for exploitation. You should expect a lot of toing and froing in terms of control of territory at the font - and this very much seems to be the case in the South where the Russian forces seem to be operating effectively. In areas where the Russian have only recently gained territory (such as around Bakhmut), where Russian defences have had less time to be established and their units may be more degraded, you would expect the situation to be even more fluid. So at this stage one should not put to much emphasis on one click gained here, lost there.
From the reports I've seen, the following points/trends seem to be emerging:
1) Western tech is giving the Ukrainian's an edge in night-fighting, which they are exploiting.
2) Russians have improved their EW capability (this was staring to become apparent a few months ago with their increased ability to disrupt himars).
3) Russians still have a formidable artillery capability, and airpower remain a constraint for the Ukrainians.
4) As expected, the Ukrainian casualty rate is increasing due to going on the offensive, but they seem less callous than the Russians with the lives of their men.
5) So far Ukraine has only deployed a fraction of the offensive capability its built up, so its way to early to judge on their effectiveness or the likely outcome of the offensive.
6) Blowing up the dam was probably done by the Russians to 'simplify' the battlefield by effectively removing a whole sector in the short term and potentially distracting Ukrainian resources.
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Post by alec on Jun 11, 2023 11:26:19 GMT
lululemonmustdobetter - all sounds very sensible. I do wonder whether there has been a bit more movement than expected in some of the operations, as there are some quite optimistic noises just starting to emerge from some sources, which in the past have heralded a more general shift in tone, but I think you're right - all of this will take time to unfold. The interesting factor about the polling though is how remarkably solid the numbers have been for the last year.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 11, 2023 11:41:28 GMT
alec , the pressure of time on the Ukrainians atm doesn't relate to domestic support at all (which in all probability isn't at risk of deteriorating for some time), its western support/commitment that's the the issue. There will ultimately be limits to the level and extent to which the west will support Ukraine, and it is far from unified in regards to this. Also each countries' own domestic political considerations will play a part. Ukraine's biggest exposure is in regards to this as it is completely dependent on the West economically and for supplies of material.
Govt's in the west may not necessarily see a long drawn out conflict, with uncertainty as to the ultimate end result as in their interests, and may start pushing for some form of negotiated settlement. If the war continues to have a negative economic impact on western economies, these pressures will increase. Then there is the big uncertainty over the US presidential elections, as well as in all likelihood a new UK govt whose priorities may be very different.
If the west do put pressure on the Ukrainians to accept some form of negotiated peace, it would not be the first or last time a country has been sold down the river by the west.
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Danny
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Post by Danny on Jun 11, 2023 11:44:22 GMT
It does make military sense for the Russians to blow up the dam because it stops any Ukranian attack towards Crimea from Kherson. However if the Ukranian army can reach the sea somewhere near Melitopol they can sever the land link to Crimea and then if they destroy the Kerch bridge, they can starve out the Russians in Crimea. i already posted somewhere the analogy between the Kerch bridge, completed just before covid struck, and the Kiel canal, completed just before WW1. Both seemed to be critical infrastructure needed before hostilities could commence. I think it might now be very difficult if Ukraine gets so far as to isolate Crimea by land and to blow the bridge, for the US or anyone to prevent them completing the job of starving out the Russians there. What they will find when they get there is another matter, because over all the occupied territory Russia has already engaged in a campaign of killing pro Ukraininas, deporting or allowing others to escape never to return to their homes, abducting the children of others and bringing in any pro russians they can find. And in Crimea this process has been going on for is it 5-10 years now. What is unknowable is how the locals in Crimea feel after having experienced Russian rule. I recall they were unhappy before the war because occupation had killed their tourist industry. Experiencing war can't have helped. They may yet turn out more pro being part of Ukraine than expected. |
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 12, 2023 12:55:01 GMT
In regards to the political/diplomatic pressure and timing of the offensive, its generally recognised by observers (from both sides), that there is a definite link between battlefield success by the Ukrainians and the level and quality of aid from the West. There is a Nato Summit July 11/12, and the Ukrainian's will want to have demonstrated by then that they can dislodge the Russians from 'meaningful' areas, thus justifying the supply of more weaponry.
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Post by Deleted on Jun 12, 2023 15:25:48 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Jun 12, 2023 17:44:32 GMT
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Post by alec on Jun 12, 2023 18:30:06 GMT
colin - those reports are confirmed. There was a loss of a number of tanks and other equipment a couple of days ago. There are also Russian reports of further strikes, backed up with drone footage, which are claimed to be wooden fakes by Ukraine, but the above images are verified. There will be losses.
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Post by Deleted on Jun 13, 2023 11:17:14 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Jun 13, 2023 14:47:54 GMT
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 13, 2023 15:38:33 GMT
Actually, most of the signs look relatively positive for the Ukrainians. Most of the 'confirmed' losses were in a sector where the more 'secure' line of fortification was closer to the front, the Russian units were better and followed defensive doctrine accurately.
As a number of commentators have flagged, the survivability rate for crew/soldiers using western equipment looks a lot higher than for Russian vehicles. I saw some footage of what looked like a direct hit on a Bradley by some form of projectile and it was able to drive off. Other footage of one hitting a mine seemed to show most of the screw surviving.
The Ukrainians, unlike the Russians, don't seem to be prone to impaling themselves on defensive areas with repeated attacks for little gain. They are probing. In fact the level of Ukraine losses I've seen are below what you would expect. The Russian infantry don't seem to have 9M133 Kornet or 9K111 ant-tank weapons, and are relying on artillery and mines. They have been using airpower with some effect - but the Ukrainian forces still seem in the main to be remaining under air defence cover.
There has been a relative lull over the past couple of days - probably due to the Ukrainians re-organising for their next probe.
Without air superiority, what the the Ukrainians are trying to do is vvvv difficult, but not impossible. Currently all the signs are that their forces are better trained, motivated and armed than their adversary.
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 13, 2023 15:53:08 GMT
On some of the footage re Russians claims they captured a Leopard, I've seen it from both sides. The Russian coverages seems to be from a lull in the fighting, soon afterwards more Ukrainians turned up - seemingly to reclaim the tank. As there is no footage of the Russians taking it away, I would assume the Ukrainians were successful in reclaiming it. It looks like it lost its tracks when it hit a mine, so should be reparable.
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Post by Deleted on Jun 15, 2023 8:23:58 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Jun 21, 2023 15:59:09 GMT
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Post by lululemonmustdobetter on Jun 23, 2023 9:26:55 GMT
A number of the Russian bloggers keep on making reference to the NATO summit in 11-12 July. The assumption they seem to be working to is that the Ukrainians need to have to secured a 'success' by then in order to maintain Western aid. From a Russian perspective this is an understandable assumption to make - Putin's initial decision to expand his war against Ukraine by invading with regular Russian troops, was very probably influenced by an assumption of Western weakness and lack of resolve as shown by the debacle in Afghanistan. Moscow will view western support as Ukraine's Achilles heel. This would help to explain the stiffness of Russia's defence and how they seem to be throwing everything at thwarting it - stall the offensive and stem the flow of aid, with some western powers putting pressure on Ukraine to go to the negotiating table.
Personally, I think the Russian's are working under a false assumption. I think the only political event in the west that could significantly alter western resolve would be a Trump/Republican victory, but that would be over a year from now. While the Ukrainians will naturally want to have something to show before the summit, I don't think its make or break for them. In fact, I think all they need to demonstrate is that they can dislodge the Russians from positions using the weaponry systems they have been given, which they are doing (all be it at a slow rate). The big game changer, so to speak, will be the west supplying significnat numbers of fighter jets to the Ukrainians. Hopefully, that is what the summit will actually lead to.
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Danny
Member
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Post by Danny on Jun 23, 2023 19:54:36 GMT
Ukrine seems to have mastered the art of propaganda. Guess thats a benefit of having a stand up comedian as prime minister, he knows how to play an audience. Ukraine has been making a case to persuade the west to supply it with planes, and it sounds like there are loads of suitable second line jets potentially available. What is needed is to persaude public opinion why they are needed and should be given. And frankly it is working, we are standing by allowing brave Ukrainians to die for lack of giving them our old jets. |
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Post by leftieliberal on Jun 23, 2023 20:36:51 GMT
John Simpson on Russian casualties in Ukraine (an i newspaper newsletter). As Russia's death toll grows, Putin's population could turn against him
Right across Russia, from St Petersburg to Vladivostok, volunteers have been making discreet visits to military cemeteries and official commemorations and jotting down the names of soldiers who have died in the Ukraine war. Then, equally discreetly, they've passed the names on to the BBC in London or to independent journalists in Russia itself.
It's part of a project which the BBC Russian service has been carrying out with an independent Russian media outlet, Mediazona, to work out an accurate and reliable figure for the number of Russians dead, using properly documented sources: names on graves, messages from relatives, and official notifications.
The Kremlin refuses to issue figures of its own, and the 24-hour rolling news programmes on Russian TV have put the number as low as 8,000. By contrast, Ukraine's military claim to have inflicted 200,000 deaths and injuries. So what's the real figure? Olga Ivshina, a senior correspondent for the BBC Russian service, says they've been able to document 25,528 deaths so far, including more than 2,150 officers and 161 pilots, each and every one of them named.
John Simpson is the BBC's world affairs editor. Unspun World can be seen at 11.15 pm on Wednesday nights on BBC Two, at 12.30pm on Saturday and at 04.30 and 11.30 on Sunday on the BBC News Channel.
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