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Post by James E on Jan 17, 2024 23:43:13 GMT
James E As the fight between the 'big two' seems to be over, my interest is now on the next bunch. SNP will obviously have decent representation even if they lose some. Of the next 3 (LDM, RFM and GRN) only LibDem are likely to get more than one seat even if the percentages stay as in this poll (because of their strength in certain areas). I will be very interested to see how the percentages of those parties change over the next few polls because even if they don't get many seats they could well affect results in a good number. To me, it's very hard to call 3rd place in seats at the moment between SNP and LDs. I still expect the SNP to win more than half of seats in Scotland on a smallish lead in overall votes. But the LDs will gain in seats regardless of a 8-14% poll rating, provided that the Tories are below 30%. I've run that YG poll through Electoral Calculus, but with my usual allowance for Lab/LD/Green tactical voting, and the seat figures come out as: Lab 557 LDM 35 SNP 23 Con 15 (5 of these in Scotland) Grn 1 PC 1 So Ed Davey as Opposition Leader despite the 8% vote share and 4th place in the overall vote.
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Post by James E on Jan 17, 2024 22:56:38 GMT
Westminster Voting Intention:
LAB: 47% (+2) CON: 20% (-2) RFM: 12% (+4) LDM: 8% (+1) GRN: 7% (-1)
Via @yougov, tbc. Changes w/ 10-11 Jan. 10:44 PM · Jan 17, 2024 · 26.8K Views (from Election maps) Changes from 10-11 Jan should be RFM +2, LDM -1.
Highest Lab lead with YouGov since a 28 in late October 2022 - 2 days after Sunak took over from Truss.
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Post by James E on Jan 17, 2024 11:18:44 GMT
If this latest Rawlings and Thresher calculation is right, and it was reported prominently on ITN news last night, and with the new constituency boundaries Labour now needs a 12% swing in it's favour to gain an overall majority, it begs an interesting question. Particularly so in the light of our interesting discussion on representative voting systems. Is it possible that Labour could "win" the next election on the popular vote and yet the Tories remain the largest party? If so, what are the critical margins here? Labour win 36-34 but Tories largest party? I take JamesE's expert coaching on UNS and the weaknesses in the R&T modelling, but could we get a 1951 style result in the next election, I wonder? A classic disproportionate one on the cards? If R&T are right, it rather blows both mine and Jimjam"s predictions out of the water!! No 50 seat overall Labour majority on a 6% lead. It is good to finally have notional 2019 results for the new boundaries, but these are really no surprise. The old boundries also showed Labour needing about a 12-13% UNS swing, and the pattern of the changes makes a very slight shift towards the Conservatives. But the reporting of this by the BBC (and ITN) is downright misleading. There have been numerous cases in the past 30 years where the apparent, UNS-based target for either Lab or Con to achieve a majority has shifted by as much as 7 points. For example, going into GE1997, the Tories appeared to need about a 5-6% lead to get an overall majority, but after the 1997 election, this rose to around 13%. Labour's apparent target for a majority rose from 2-3% on the basis of GE2010 to 9% after the 2015 results. So a fall in the apparent Labour target from 12-13% to 4-5% would be a similar-sized shift to what has happened in the recent past. My own model, which is consistent with MRPs from Savanta, Survation, YouGov and the Electoral Calculus models, shows that in the event of a tie, Con and Lab would probably have around 290 seats each. I believe that Con could still get a majority with a 3-4% lead in the popular vote, and Labour most likely need a 4-5% lead for 325 seats+. But if I am right, these figures are unlikely to be reliable in determining what size of lead will really be needed in 2029 or 2030.
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Post by James E on Jan 16, 2024 22:10:48 GMT
Today Peter Barnes of the BBC reports on the prospects of the next General Election, telling us that " Labour needs a national swing of 12.7% to win with just a small majority."www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-67361138Strangely, there does not appear to be any BBC coverage of YouGov's large scale MRP, but just to note that a Labour lead of 39.5% to 26% , represents a 12.6% swing from 2019, and therefore would result in a hung parliament per Mr Barnes's understanding : yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/48371-yougov-mrp-shows-labour-would-win-1997-style-landslide-if-election-were-held-todayOther gems of wisdom from the same BBC article include "a uniform national swing has been a reliable model for general elections in the UK over a long period of time". So with apologies for repeating myself, this is just how reliably 'uniform' the Con to Lab swings were in 1997 : Safe Conservative held seats 13.5% Middle Conservative held seats 13.0% Marginal Conservative held seats 12.3% Marginal Labour seats 11.8% Middle Labour seats 9.8% Safe Labour seats 7.9% See page 14 of 18 www.dannydorling.org/wp-content/files/dannydorling_publication_id1318.pdfAnd in the 21st century, the apparent "target" (based on Uniform swing from the previous election) needed by the Conservatives to form a majority has shifted in a range from 3% (recently) to around 14% (in the Blair years), while for Labour the range has been even wider, as they could have gained a majority when up to 2% behind in 2005, in contrast to the 13% lead they are now supposed to need. The simple fact that these targets have moved so much in the recent past (it shifted for Labour from 7 to 13 points in 2017-19) gives the lie to the notion that UNS can be used to accurately determine the swing needed from one election to the next.
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Post by James E on Jan 16, 2024 21:08:29 GMT
Re Local By-Elections:
I posted the below in December 2022, repeating what I had stated previously on the same subject and re-quoting Anthony Wells' comments on UKPR1 in 2009.
So regular readers may have read this several times before, but not for at least a year...........
"Our former host on UKPR1 wrote on this in 2009 : "Can local by elections predict general elections?"
"Sum of local by-elections Jan-May 2005: CON 33%, LAB 26%, LDEM 31%
Actual general election result 2005: CON 33%, LAB 36%, LDEM 23%
Sum of local by-elections Jan-Jun 2001: CON 32%, LAB 30%, LDEM 26%
Actual general election result 2001: CON 33%, LAB 42%, LDEM 18%
Sum of local by-elections Jan-May 1997: CON 28%, LAB 37%, LDEM 30%
Actual general election result 1997: CON 31%, LAB 44%, LDEM 17%"
So Labour underperformed by 7, 12 and 10 points in pre-GE local by elections, and the LDs overperformed by 13, 8 and 8 points. The Conservatives' share is quite close to the subsequent GE results, though.
Incidentally, the LDs overperform (and Labour tend to underperform) in all Local Elections: another UKPR article from 2012 puts the LibDem overperformance at 7 points on average.
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Post by James E on Jan 16, 2024 11:57:00 GMT
James E, Could it be the case that MRP weightings( which is what drives seat predictions) has a similar impact to DK/WV reweighting while approaching from a different angle? Either way as per a recent post from you a 12% underlying margin of victory based on current VIs plus reasonable swingback is pretty close to the 11% in this YG MRP. Not withstanding your fair reservations about sample size, and therefore part of the application by extension, this MRP does back up our contention that UNS seriously undercalculates the number of seats Labour are set to take. Thanks for this, JimJam. I agree with your final point, of course. However, I'm not sure I agree with your first sentence above, as there has been some suggestion that MRP seat estimates would prove inaccurate once the Conservatives recovery of 'Don't Knows' was factored in. This was one of the contentions of Peter Kellner's 'grumblers and defectors' article last May, and there is at least some logic that, as the numbers of Con to DK voters, and therefore the potential for recovery, will be largest in their safe seats. So by doing an MRP with re-weighting of DK/WNV, YouGov have tested Kellner's idea. I have needed to correct what I wrote yesterday on this, as I used some figures from the Telegraph article, which YouGov have now stated are wrong. The swing is 12.6% (not 11.5%) and the Labour vote is up by 6.5% on 2019 (not 4%). With the corrected figures, the 'Labour gains per 1% swing' in this MRP is 14.5. This is just a little lower than in other MRPs which did not include any re-weighting, but still well above the 10 seats per 1% which UNS produces. So there was probably at least some merit in Kellner's point about the 'grumblers', but it is nowhere near as significant as he suggested.
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Post by James E on Jan 15, 2024 10:57:09 GMT
That Telegraph/YouGov seat prediction - Some relevant details from their article:
It's an MRP of 14,000 voters, done 'over the new year'. That's a relatively low sample for an MRP - YG take about 50,000 responses for their General Election MRPs. Such a small sample means that it needs to be taken with a pinch of salt in Scotland in particuar, where they are likely to have had fewer than 1,000 positive responses.
They state that: 'It also factors in the large numbers of undecided voters and which way they are most likely to vote, known as electoral tightening'. This is really important to bear in mind. Opinium's adjustment typically has the effect of a 6-7% reduction to Labour's lead. It is not stated how YouGov are treating undecided voters, but if they are following Opinium's methodology, the adjustment with YouGov is likely to be even larger. When I did a detailed comparison of Opinium and YouGov last May/June, the average figures for Don't Know and WNV were 26% with Opinium and 31% with YouGov.
This may explain why their headline figures are so different to the normal YouGov polls, the last 4 of which average as Con 22.5%, Lab 44.5%. It looks like the VI figures here, after the adjustments, are roughly Con 27%, Lab 38%. They state that the overall Con to Lab swing is 11.5%, and that in England and Wales Con are down 18 points and Lab up by 4. I am inferring that Labour are up by a lot more than 4 points in Scotland due to their seat gains, so as to be up by 5% across GB. So an 11 point lead after adjustments compared with an average 22% lead in the most recent normal YouGovs. I can just about see how the 38/27 figures acould be within range of the closest recent YouGov of 43/24, with the re-weighting adjustment making a hefty 8 point difference, but it would be good to see the tables.
There are some interesting details in the seat results. LibDems appear to do well, the best result being winning Horsham. Labour win Mordaunt's seat of Portsmouth North, plus Banbury, the Isle of Wight seats and Welwyn. Labour just misses Mogg's seat, where their figures are Con 33%, Lab 32%, LD 17%. The weak Labour performance in safe seats is consistent with other recent detailed polling, and Local Election results. The Telegraph seems alarmed that 80% of those voters deserting the Tories were Leave voters in 2016 but this should come as no great surprise to anyone, given that that 80% of the 2019 Tory vote was made up of Leave voters.
The result conforms closely to the '15 seats for 1% swing' pattern of other MRPs. Here Labour are gaining 183 seats from the 202 they held in 2019 on an 11.5% swing, which is 15.9 seats per 1%.
[EDIT - 24 hours on, I have found that several of the figures which I took from the Telegraph article were incorrect. See the statement from YouGov themselves to this effect. The swing is in fact 12.6%, and Labour are up by more than 4 points. The actual figures were Lab 39.5%, Con 26%. With the correct swing, the 'seats per 1% swing' is in fact 14.5 per this MRP]
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Post by James E on Jan 14, 2024 11:37:55 GMT
So presumably you think people in Northern Ireland who have no trouble voting under STV are much cleverer than people in England then? Possibly true, although the DUP doesn't provide convincing evidence. There was clear evidence of confusion in Northern Ireland when the system was first introduced. Many voters thought that the numbers placed on ballot papers represented the number of votes awarded to each candidate - rather than a preference. Some people emerged from polling stations saying to party representatives 'I gave you most votes - I gave you 8!' I don't see Labour MPs supporting PR without a Referendum - particularly if it had not been a manifesto committment.
What exactly is your 'clear evidence of confusion' in respect of the early Northern Ireland EU elections? The results of the first two EU elections in 1979 and 1984 (links below) do not appear to provide any indication of this: they were very much in line with other NI elections at that time, with the largest votes going to Paisley, Hume and John Taylor each time. I was living in Northern Ireland at the time of the June 1984 election, and can not recall anyone complaining that they did not understand the preference system. cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/re1979.htmcain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/re1984.htm[What I do remember is some people claiming that STV was chosen to ensure that SF did not win a seat. A large FPTP seat covering the western side of NI - say Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh and L'Derry - would have been fiercely contested between all 4 of the largest NI parties]
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Post by James E on Jan 11, 2024 21:31:34 GMT
@jimjam
Looking at this in more detail, I can see that the adjustments could be somewhat bigger than my rough estimate.
I am allowing for Labour's DKs to return to them as well as the Tories'. So taking the most recent YouGov, the calculations are:
Con 26% DKs x 45% 2019vote /2 = 5.85 Lab 9% DKs x 33% 2019vote /2 = 1.5 So the net difference there is 4.35 points** , not 3.
And with Reform UK on 9 points per YouGov, an adjustment of one-third to the Tories gives them another 3 points.
Of course the figures would then need to be re-based to percentages. And it is normal for the Green vote to be squeezed a bit towards an actual election, so if you factor in 1 point going to Labour for that, we get back to my rough estimate of the Tories closing Labour's lead by about 6 points.
**This is rather less than the 6-7 points difference that Opinium's methodology makes. And of course, such an adjustment should not be applied to polling figures from Opinium or MIC, whose headline figures already include their own, larger adjustment for the 'Don't Knows'.
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Post by James E on Jan 11, 2024 20:38:51 GMT
More In Common 🌹Labour 42% (-) 🌳Conservatives 27% (-1) 🔶Liberal Democrats 10% (-1) 🟣Reform UK 9% (+1) 💚Greens 8% (+2) Labour lead of 15 Field work 9/1-11/1 That's right in line with the norm for MiC, whose previous 12 polls, dating back to April, have averaged a 14-15 point Labour lead. They are another company who re-weight their figures in a similar manner to Opinium.
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Post by James E on Jan 11, 2024 15:52:36 GMT
"Reform are not standing" (in Kingswood).
This sets up an interesting race for all the other fringe parties on the right. No fewer than 8 such parties have contested one or more of the Parliamentary by-elections in the past 6 months :
Reclaim Party Heritage Party UKIP SDP BF CPA English Democrats Scottish Family Party
You could probably add the anti-Ulez candidates in Uxbridge to that, too.
Four of these stood in Uxbridge in RefUK's absence, so I'd expect similar here. Those of the above who do stand can probably expect to share 3-4% of the total vote.
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Post by James E on Jan 11, 2024 11:43:15 GMT
As an explanation as to why the Labour gains are likely to be so much better than UNS: the past 7 YouGovs from mid-November onwards show an overall 17% swing from Con to Lab, but the various demographic cross-breaks show just how strongly this is skewed towards the Tories' strongest areas of support.
Leave voters 23% swing South England 22.5% Midlands 19% Class ABC1 18%
North England 15% Class C2DE 15%
Scotland 10% London 9% Wales 8% Remain voters 7%
This is not entirely a product of having held larger leads in those demographic groups at the top of the list. The Conservatives are actually keeping a larger proportion if the 2019 vote in Scotland, London and perhaps Wales, and also with their small group of Remain voters. This is the opposite of what happens in a Uniform National Swing.
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Post by James E on Jan 11, 2024 11:20:00 GMT
I think I saw a post recently from the estimable James E , (or possibly the equally estimable jimjam or neilj ), to the effect that the most recent polling averages had LAB on c45% and CON on c26%. I was wondering how much 'cushion' that built in to the prospect of a LAB victory later this year. So I had a little tinker on Electoral Calculus and plugged in what would seem to be very harsh VI for LAB and seemingly optimistic VI for CON given current polling. I decided to plump for LAB 38% and CON 33%, i.e. a swing back to CON of 7% vis à vis current standings. That's quite a lot considering how relatively stable LAB and CON VI has been over virtually the last year. Anyhoo, I got LAB on 321 seats, 5 short of an overall majority. Considering the SF situation, that suggests to me that LAB would be able to govern alone, without relying on support from other parties. CON would be on 241 seats. Conclusion: CON seem to need something seismic to break in their favour during the coming months to have even a sniff of retaining power. Thanks for that! The polling average has been in the 15-20% range for nearly 12 months now, and this does not look like ending soon. As for the margin needed for a Labour majority: There is close agreement between Electoral Calculus and the larger MRPs from Survation and Savanta towards the end of last year on this. The headline figures are each showing Labour taking around 400-425 seats on a lead of around 17%. The pattern in each case is that they show Labour gaining around 15 seats for each 1% swing from the Conservatives (as opposed to the 10 seats per 1% implied by UNS). I would expect the Tories to recover around one-third of the RefUK VI and up to half of their 2019 voters who 'Don't Know'* which would give them a boost of 6 points and cut the Labour lead from around 18 to around 12. With this in mind, here is a scale of how various different Labour leads might translate in seats, based on those MRPs and the '15 seats per 1% swing' pattern. 3% Labour lead- 315 seats (10 short) 5% Labour lead- 330 seats (majority of 10) 7% Labour lead - 345 seats (majority of 40) 9% Labour lead- 360 seats (majority of 70) 11% Labour lead-375 seats (majority of 100) 13% Labour lead - 390 seats (majority of 130) 15% Labour lead - 405 seats (majority of 160) 17% Labour lead - 420 seats (majority of 190)** 19% Labour lead - 435 seats (maajority of 220) *around a quarter of Con2019 voters answer 'Don't Know', which is 11% of everyone who voted. All precedents suggest that some recovery of this is likely (and the same applies to the 8-10% 2019Lab DKs). ** my figures are modelled around this figure of 420 seats on a 17% lead in the vote. This would be 218 Labour gains on a swing of 14%, hence about 15 seats per 1%. The Survation and Savanta MRP figures showed the SNP still dominant in Scotland with Labour taking around 10-15 Scottish seats. If you think Labour will do significantly better/worse than this in Scotland, then adjust their seat total up or down.
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Post by James E on Jan 10, 2024 13:15:24 GMT
Savanta puts Labour 19 points ahead.
FIRST Westminster Voting Intention of 2024
📈19pt Labour lead - largest since Oct '23.
🌹Lab 45 (+2) 🌳Con 26 (-1) 🔶LD 10 (=) ➡️Reform 8 (-1) 🌍Green 5 (+2) 🎗️SNP 3 (=) ⬜️Other 4 (-1)
2,268 UK adults, 5-7 January
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Post by James E on Jan 9, 2024 17:10:29 GMT
..... Labour should now be more confident of winning in places like Wycombe, Colchester, Altrincham, or the Bournemouth seats than in Bassetlaw or Mansfield. I would be supried to see labour re-take any seat which voted 65%+ for Leave in a General Election, even though they did narrowly manage that in the Tamworth by-election. Thanks for that analysis (you are one of the reasons I keep coming back here!) It is hard to grasp the nuances of polling in areas whose characteristics are somewhat dissimilar to one's own.
It does strike me that, if Labour gain power through the votes of wealthier (if perhaps more socially liberal) folk in the South of England, then to maintain power it would be wise for them to govern in their interests. I don't think it's sensible for people to continue to characterise any political party as having an immutable set of values, hence the decreasing value of looking back at polling or election results from the 1970s or 80s.The position of Voting Intentions by social class is now rather confused, as different pollsters show very different figures. To take the average of the past 3 Deltapolls, they show: Deltapoll ABC1s Lab 37% Con 30% Deltapoll C2DEs Lab 47% Con 25% However, the recent averages per YouGov are: ABC1s Lab 49% Con 21% C2DEs Lab 42% Con 27% So YG and Delta are 7 points apart for C2DEs, and 21 points apart for ABC1s. If you split the difference, the two groups average almost the same result. My approach to try to get a meaningful picture of changes is to compare YouGov's figures with their own previous analyses. And they are continuing to show Labour making more progress in the higher social classes, as they have been doing steadily for decades. But what is also clear is that Social Class alone is now a very poor predictor of Voting Intention. Several polls and analyses I have seen have produced similar results for their AB and DE samples. And as I have mentioned before, the Conservatives' stongest social demographic is now C2 voters, whereas Labour do best with C1s. This was already the case at GE2019 (see link below) but has become more so. yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/26925-how-britain-voted-2019-general-election?redirect_from=%2Ftopics%2Fpolitics%2Farticles-reports%2F2019%2F12%2F17%2Fhow-britain-voted-2019-general-election
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Post by James E on Jan 9, 2024 11:57:59 GMT
CB, I think the contentious line in the YG Red Wall piece is the below: ''For Labour, failing to win back the constituencies across the North and Midlands which fell to Johnson’s Conservatives – and indeed to May in 2017 – would spell defeat.'' I think it is hard to see Labour securing an OM without taking those seats back that they lost in 2019. (May be an odd one they don't for very local factors). This only get's them back to 262, though, and therefore short of an OM by 60 seats or so (SF abstain). Simply then Labour MUST take additional seats to 2019 losses being recovered. Where I think you are right is that this does nor mean retaking all those they lost in 2017. Scotland could see 20 gains for Labour (15 from the SNP) and other seats in more 'remainery' areas that Labour didn't gain in 2017 followed by a wider margin of defeat in 2019 could well fall Labour in 2024. I think YG are right in the sense that the type of voters Labour lost across 2017 and 2019 (I would add 2015 as well) need to largely return but whether they need to retake all the seats that fell is less clear to me. Mansfield may well stay Tory for example and Labour could win without it... I did a comparison of YG's recent detailed figures to the 1997 General Election last month (p214 if anyone is interested). The same figures can of course be compared to GE2015. My conclusion is that Labour are probably not winning back the same kind of voters who they lost post-2016. By social class, YG show a swing of close to 20% among ABC1 voters compared to 2015, but only around 6-7% with C2DEs. Because of this, and the changing geographical pattern of voting in England, Labour should now be more confident of winning in places like Wycombe, Colchester, Altrincham, or the Bournemouth seats than in Bassetlaw or Mansfield. I would be supried to see labour re-take any seat which voted 65%+ for Leave in a General Election, even though they did narrowly manage that in the Tamworth by-election.
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Post by James E on Jan 9, 2024 11:19:13 GMT
YouGov's figures again show a very significant Labour lead (of 16%) in the South of England. And across their most recent 6 polls, the average has been a Labour lead of 14 points, ranging between 9 and 18. With each sample being around 675 people, this is based on around 4,000 responses.
This would be a swing of 23% compared to 2019, when the Tories led by 32 points. Perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that it would represent a 12% Con to Lab swing when compared to the 1997 election, in which the Tories still managed an overall 9% lead in the South.
The Kingswood by election should be very interesting. In most respects, it seems to typify the demograhics in which the Con to Lab swings (per YG) are the largest, being Southern, Leave voting and above-average ABC1.
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Post by James E on Jan 6, 2024 13:07:28 GMT
pete The curse of demographics. It also of course applied to national idiots day in 2016. Irrespective of the fact that around 20% of brexitanians have changed their mind because of the inevitability of death and the fact that half the Brexit voters were over 55 by the end of this decade of those still alive who voted in the 2016 referendum the majority for remain would be a similar percentage to the 1974 EEC referendum, polling which already indicated a 55:35 split amongst those who have an opinion on Rejoining indicates that this is firmly on track for a 70%+ preference to rejoin by the end of the first term.of the incoming Labour government. Slight exaggeration there, Steve. The current average of all polls on 'Rejoin/Stay Out' is 58/42 for Rejoin. And while there is considerable variance between individual pollsters (BMJ show low leads, and WeThink high ones) the like-with-like comparisons show a very settled picture. YouGov, who I regard as the most reliable, average 59/41 across three polls in the past 3 months. Opinion has stabilised in the past 3-6 months, whereas in the previous 2 years there was a steady rise in support for rejoining. However, the age-split on this means that there is a trend towards Rejoin over time. This is worth about a 0.6% swing per year. This is likely to be significant, as views on Brexit are very entrenched - far more so than Voting Intention or almost any issue you might name. The age-division has become even greater since 2016, with those changing their minds being concentrated in the under 65s, while opinion among the over-65s has moved by just a few points. Looking ahead to around 2030, support for rejoining might be expected to rise to around 63% against 37% for staying out, even if no-one changes their mind.
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Post by James E on Jan 4, 2024 12:39:04 GMT
The other point that Kellner seems unwilling to acknowledge is the factor of Govrnment recovery. Current MRPs reflect polling which puts Labour around 16-17% ahead. However, the normal fall in the polling lead for an opposition from this point is around 4-7 points. How are you defining 'normal'? Perhaps as an average? ? Yes, it's the average of the last 4 Parliaments which have run to the full 5 year. I am comparing the average of Opinion polls in the exact month 4 years on from the previous election (as we are now) with the final opinion polling average (not the actual result, because polling error is a different thing) So... 1982-92: June 1991 polls Lab 6% ahead, final polls Lab 1% ahead. 5-point swing back 1992-97: April 1995 polls Lab 25% ahead, final polls Lab 18% ahead. 7-point swing back. 2005-10: May 2009 polls Con 16% ahead, final polls Con 8% ahead. 8-point swing back. 2010-15: May 2014 polls Lab 3% ahead, final polls Con 1% ahead. 4-point swing back. A significant part of this is of course the recovery of the 'Don't Knows', which is factored in to some current polling. The adjusted polls, such as Opinium, point towards a similar narrowing of about 6 points for those polls which treat 'Don't know' as 'would not vote'. But there's wider point here: Kellner seems to be saying that MRPs showing Labour on 400-430 seats with a 17% lead are going to be proved wrong if Labour were now to get (say) 375 seats, and a 100-majority on a lead of 11%. I'd disagree, because a movement of 6 points in the polls would in inevitably shift a very significant number of seats. I've seen a similar fatuous argument that an MRP taken in May 2017, when the Conservatives were 18 points ahead in the polls, was proved totally wrong by the actual result a month later, ignoring the huge shift in the polls during the month which followed.
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Post by James E on Jan 3, 2024 16:43:43 GMT
PJW, Like you I think MRP is not as accurate as some would have it but the idea of more seats falling than UNS suggests when swings are large is just maths. If Tory support drops 25% from 44% to 33% and this is even then in seats where they have more support they will lose more votes as a %age. If they won a seat with 40% they will be at 30% but if 56% they drop to 42%, bringing it in to play more than UNS suggests. Of course Labour's extra vote share is lower using the proportionate approach in seats where they are further behind but as the base is lower the %age impact is less. For me the hardest thing to account for is if the many new Tory MPs have gained any meaningful incumbency bonus which in some seats will be double with the former (Labour MP) usually having some personal vote built up greater than the PPC will receive. The most interesting part was Kellner's categorical statement: "Historically, swings between Labour and Conservative have never behaved like that. Of course, individual seats vary; but in election after election, swings in safe seats have been much the same as in marginal seats." I'm pretty sure that isn't what happened in 1997, with the swing statistically lower in Labour held seats and closer Tory held marginals than it was in safe Tory seats and you would think Peter Kellner knows that. So his determination to claim the opposite seems strange. Yes, the swings in 1997 were indeed higher in Con-held seats, and lower in safe Labour seats. The swings, compared to 1992 were: Safe Con 13.5% Middle Con 13.0% Marginal Con 12.3% Marginal Lab 11.8% Middle Lab 9.8% Safe Lab 7.9% See page 14 of 18 www.dannydorling.org/wp-content/files/dannydorling_publication_id1318.pdfThe other point that Kellner seems unwilling to acknowledge is the factor of Govrnment recovery. Current MRPs reflect polling which puts Labour around 16-17% ahead. However, the normal fall in the polling lead for an opposition from this point is around 4-7 points. Given that the MRPs are showing Labour gaining around '15 seats per 1% swing' from Con since 2019, it is reasonable to expect the Labour seat tally to be reduced by 30-50 from the recent MRPs which currently give them 400-430 seats. So the 'majority' may well fall by 60-100. But this pattern is a normal feature of polling as we approach a General Election, not a failing of MRP.
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Post by James E on Jan 1, 2024 19:52:52 GMT
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Post by James E on Dec 22, 2023 21:18:37 GMT
graham"Another example. Polls in January/February 1979 gave the Tories leads of 19%/20%. On May 3rd that year they won the election by 7% - so a narrowng of 12%/13% over just 3 months or so." You seem to be selecting the highest leads from the polls in question rather than looking at the average. There were indeed 2 polls with 19 and 20% Con leads in Jan & Feb1979, but the average of a very mixed set of 5 was a Con lead of 9-10%. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_1979_United_Kingdom_general_election
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Post by James E on Dec 22, 2023 19:49:09 GMT
Labour will, I think, be happy with the year end polls. [edit] ...this ineptitude, this simplism, and we hope for better days. But such is the damage, that wait could be a long one. I don't disagree really, but will add my note of caution yet again. In late August 1969 the Tories under Ted Heath still enjoyed a 15% lead in the polls over Labour. They went on to win the June 1970 GE - but only by 2.4% and the Tory victory came as a great shock. For a slightly more recent comparison, I think the precedent of 1996-97 is more relevant here than 1969-70. Looking back to the 5 polls done in April 1996 - so 4 years on from the previous GE, as we are now - the polls averaged Con 28%, Lab 53%, LD 15%. The final polls showed Labour 18 points ahead, so making a like-with -like comparison, the Tories' recovery was by 7 points. The polls also overstated Labour, but polling error is a different thing to Government recovery. If the Conservatives can make a similar recovery now, they would cut the deficit from 18 to 11 points. For a couple of other comparisons to the 4-year point: In May 2009, the Tories averaged a 14% lead, which was again reduced by 7 points in the final pre-election polls. And in May 2014, Labour had around a 3% lead, which turned into a 1% Con lead in the final polls - a 4 point movement.
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Post by James E on Dec 16, 2023 18:22:28 GMT
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Post by James E on Dec 10, 2023 20:58:49 GMT
As we've touched on the 1997 General Election, here's another bit of analysis. I've done my usual YouGov cross-break analysis by 'region' and class, but here the comparisons are to where things stood after the 1997 landslide. For anyone expecting the individual constituency results to look like they did in the Blair years, the short answer is that isn't going to happen.
These figures reflect the 8 YG polls from 18 Oct onwards, which currently average as a Labour lead of 22%. Some allowance for 'swing-back' really should be made - say 4% for a winning margin of 14%.
London Lab 55% (+6) Con 20% (-11) Swing Con to Lab 9% since 1997.
South of England Lab 40% (+9) Con 28% (-12) LD 13.5% (-10) Swing Con to Lab 10.5% since 1997.
Midlands Lab 46% (-2) Con 28% (-6) Swing Con to Lab 2% since 1997.
North of England Lab 53% (-2) Con 21% (-4) Swing Con to Lab 1% since 1997.
Scotland Lab 32% (-13) Con 14% (-4) SNP 36% (+12) Swing Lab to SNP 12.5% since 1997.
Wales Lab 45% (-8) Con 17% (-3) Swing Lab to Con 2.5% since 1997.
ABC1 Voters Lab 48% (+14) Con 21% (-18) Swing Con to Lab 16% since 1997
C2DE Voters Lab 41% (-13) Con 27% (+3) Swing Lab to Con 8% since 1997
Some of these changes are already visible. The shift in London towards Labour has been evident in the past 3 elections, and as of 2019 the Tories were already faring better with C2DE voters than ABC1's (per YouGov's analysis, at least) . However, this has become even more pronounced in the past 4 years. Labour is likely to fare less well in Wales than in 1997 and very likely also to less dominant than it once was in the North of England. On the other hand, the South is going to look very different. Even if we take Opinium's figures as an alternative, these show a 6% Con to Lab swing from 1997 in the South, with Labour 4 points ahead where they trailed by 9 points in the 1997 landslide. And this is in the context of Opinium's re-weighting methodology which reduces Labour average lead from around 22% to 15%.
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Post by James E on Dec 10, 2023 19:36:27 GMT
...... Regarding target seats etc… as the swing towards Labour has mounted, to what extent do Labour shift resources away from the marginals with smaller conservative majorities they might now be expected to win easily given the polling, towards taking on some of the bigger Conservative majorities that now might come into play given the expected big swing? (Versus to what extent do they play it safe?) I can't tell you what Labour should be doing, but I can tell you what they are doing, which is ignoring the polls and MRP predictions and behaving as if the next GE will be a tight one where they need to concentrate resources on the marginals as based primarily on 2019. Locally most of the north Essex and some south Suffolk CLPs are being told to send all resources to Colchester at the GE and ignore the fact that MRPs are suggesting that a number of other 'non-target' seats are currently vulnerable. Based on my colleagues in Braintree and Witham not everyone is happy about that as they want to campaign in their own area. ........ It is worth noting that this is what happened in 1997, with Labour HQ sticking to its list of targets drawn up after 1992 and sending most resources there, only to find that the anti-Conservative mood meant that they won loads of seats they didn't expect to. It is possible this could happen again at the next GE, but I don't see Labour centrally changing its approach. As you have mentioned 'what happened in 1997', I was reminded of some contemparary analysis of how Labour fared in Conservative-held seats 26 years ago. Per page 14 of 18 in the article below, Labour performed better than the overall GB swing in Conservative-held seats in 1997, many of which would have been well beyond the 90 (of 335-ish) they targetted. As the tables show that there were 63 'marginal' Con seats with Lab in second, 43 'possible' and '69' safe', so it seems logical that Labour's 90- targets would have included all the 'marginal' ones, plus around half of the 'possibles'. Labour performed above UNS in all Con-held seats, but did best of all in the untargetted 'safe' ones. www.dannydorling.org/wp-content/files/dannydorling_publication_id1318.pdfConservative held seats from 1992-97, vote change Marginal : Con -12.3%, Lab +12.2% Possible: Con - 12.2%, Lab +13.7% Safe: Con -13.1%, Lab +13.8% These figures compared to an average Con vote-share fall in all GB seats of 11.5%, and an average Lab rise in all seats of 9.5%.
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Post by James E on Dec 10, 2023 17:58:46 GMT
"...the outcome for the Conservatives could be bleak indeed – maybe as few as 130 seats..." There was a little-publicised MRP from Survation just 6 weeks ago which may be relevant here. Sample was around 12,000, so not huge by MRP standards, but larger than a normal poll. The results were: Con 29.3% (151 seats) Lab 45.8% (435 seats) LD 11% (15 seats) SNP 3% (28 seats) Grn 4% (1 seat) RefUK 5% So this is a poll where the Tories are getting a relatively large share (4 points above their average) and the Labour lead is a bit lower than average on 16.5%. It's worth considering what the figures would look like if the Conservatives did a bit better than this. Taking the Low/High figures from Survation's data of Can 31%, Lab 44%, this would shift around 25 seats back to the Tories - using '7 seats per point' and cutting the lead by 3.5%. But looking at the detailed seat findings, it iseems to me that even this may be overstating the Tories. The reason is that Survation do not seem to be making allowance for the dynamics of LibDem held seats, nor where they are the obvious challengers. Survation have the LDs taking just one seat in Scotland, for example. The LDs would almost certainly profit hugely from tactical votes in their target seats if the Conservatives only get around 30%. Similarly, I can see close Con/Lab seats in England where there does not appear to be any squeeze on the projected LD share. Tactical voting is (IMO) likely to cost the Tories 30-40 seats at the next election - about half of those going to the LDs. Putting these factors together, I would estimate that the Conservatives would win as few as 130 seats in the event that they finish around 15-16% behind Labour in the popular vote - which in my view is right at the top end of the range of plauible outcomes. www.survation.com/archive/2023-2/(click on 14 Nov docs)
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Post by James E on Dec 8, 2023 21:12:01 GMT
There's an interesting contrast between c-a-r-f-r-e-w 's Telegraph/MoreinCommon article claiming that the Tories would far much better if Reform UK did not exist and oldnat 's YouGov polling (14:33 today, p207) which found that "Most planning to vote for Reform UK wouldn’t switch to Conservatives even if their first choice party doesn’t stand in their constituency". There is no denying that ReformUK's support is almost entirely derived from Con or BXP voters in 2019, but the idea that they might all revert to the Tories looks to me like wishful thinking. yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/47759-conservatives-unlikely-to-win-over-reform-uk-supporters-at-next-electionYouGov find that if there is no RUK candidate, 31% of current Reform UK voters would switch to the Conservatives with 3% going to Labour. With Reform averaging 8.5% in the polls, this could be worth a 2.4 point boost to the Tories. With 1 point being worth 5-7 seats, this would save them around 15 seats.
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Post by James E on Dec 8, 2023 17:07:59 GMT
There's a comparison to be made between polls at the start of the year and where we are now.
YouGov's first 6 polls of 2023 in Jan to early Feb averaged: Lab 47% Con 25% LD 9% Ref 6.5% Grn 6.5%
And their most recent 6 in Nov-early Dec average:
Lab 45% (-2) Con 23% (-2) LD 10% (+1) Ref 8.5% (+2) Grn 7.5% (+1)
It's a similar story with Opinium, with Lab 44 Con 28 turning into Lab 42, Con 26.
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Post by James E on Dec 8, 2023 16:37:27 GMT
We Think 'A Tory backlash over #Rwanda, Boris’s missing WhatsApps from the #Covid Inquiry, and ministerial resignations. It’s been another wild week. Upshot = #Labour lead is up four to 20. 🔴 Lab 45% (+1) 🔵 Con 25% (-3) 🟠 LD 11% (+2) ⚪ Ref 9% (+1) 🟢 Green 5% (-1) 🟡 SNP 2% (-1)' We Think's previous 10 polls showed an average Labour lead of 19%, so this is probably largely just a reversion to the norm.
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